1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
Iraq’s
neighbours would bring an end to illegal oil exports and give
practical support
to enforce
the revised controls. UN control of oil revenues would be
retained.
SCR 1284
would remain on the table with modest incentives for Iraqi
compliance.
Meanwhile,
UNMOVIC would retain a role outside Iraq.
“The NFZs
would continue with patrolling patterns that minimise risk and
possibly
a smaller
area of coverage … We will work for fundamental change in Iraq, and
will
issue a
‘Contract with the Iraqi People’. A renewed effort would be made to
secure
regional
acceptance of this framework.”
233.
The paper did
not repeat the advice in the 15 February version of the paper
that
departments
did not agree on whether UNMOVIC’s entry into Iraq would be
desirable
or
undesirable but advised that, if Iraq complied with resolution
1284, UNMOVIC would
operate
inside Iraq.
234.
The paper set
out the “New arrangements to be introduced straight
away”,
including:
•
“Replace
sanctions with controls … to focus on military and dual-use goods,
as
listed in a
revised Controlled Goods List”;
•
improved
border monitoring; and
•
Iraqi oil
revenues to remain under UN control and illegal trade to be
brought
within the
scheme.
235.
Those
arrangements would require a new resolution.
236.
On “regime
change”, the paper stated:
“The US and
UK would re-make the case against Saddam Hussein. We would
issue
a Contract
with the Iraqi People, setting out our goal of a peaceful
law-abiding Iraq,
fully
reintegrated into the international community, with its people free
to live in a
society
based on the rule of law, respect for human rights and economic
freedom,
and without
threat of repression, torture and arbitrary arrest. The Contract
would
make clear
that the Iraqi regime’s record and behaviour made it impossible for
Iraq
to meet the
criteria for rejoining the international community without
fundamental
change
…”
237.
On “military
measures”, the paper stated:
“(i) We
would be prepared to reduce the territory covered by the NFZs, e.g.
by
restricting
the Northern NFZ to the Kurdish controlled areas and removing
low
priority
areas from the Southern NFZ;
(ii) Red
lines would be set out and if Iraq were in material breach of
them,
e.g. by reconstituting
its military capacity to threaten its neighbours, or developing
its
WMD/missile
capabilities, it would be clear that we would take direct action,
at a time
of our
choosing, once the necessary regional support and legal base were
in place.”
237