3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
is that we
must test the French veto threat to destruction and put our
resolution to
the vote …
Certainly we should give no hint to the French of looking at
options short
of putting
our text to a vote.
“It is
possible that a find by the inspectors would be what it takes to
move
[President] Chirac
away from a veto. If there were a find (see separate note),
it
would be
well worth your talking to Chirac to see if it will do the
trick.”
1051.
On the timing
for a vote, the “preference, shared by the US,” was to seek a
vote
“as soon
after 7 March as we are confident that we have nine positive
votes”. With the
planned
ultimatum, there would then be “a week or so before the start of
military action
to work on
public opinion, rather than attempting to do this before the
vote”.
1052.
Mr Rycroft
concluded:
“On 7
March, we need to turn Blix’s ‘clusters’ document to our advantage.
We need
to stress
that it is not exhaustive, yet it still offers a damning indictment
of Iraq’s
failure to
co-operate. It comprises sections on 29 different weapons/agents …
for
each of
which Blix includes outstanding questions for Iraq to answer. (I am
sending
you the
complete list …) At 167 pages, it shows not only what Iraq would
have to
do in the
future to give full co-operation, but also what Iraq should have
done over
the last 12
years. This is further compelling evidence, if any were needed, of
Iraq’s
failure to
co-operate fully.”
1053.
Responding to
a request from Mr Blair for further information on the
UNMOVIC
“clusters”
document; a minute from Mr Nicholas Cannon, Mr Blair’s
Assistant Private
Secretary
for Foreign Affairs, described it as “rather historical” and that
most of the
information
was drawn from UNSCOM’s work.330
The UK had
“urged” Dr Blix to “give
appropriate
weight to post-1998 unresolved issues”. He had “promised to try”,
but
argued that
while it was “possible to establish material balances for the
earlier period”,
it was
“less clear what one could do with the flat Iraqi denial of any
activity in the latter
period”;
and it was “unclear whether all gaps could be
resolved”.
1054.
Mr Cannon
reported that France, Germany and Russia had pressed for
the
“clusters”
document and the UNMOVIC work programme, to be released to the
Security
Council.
The UK thought that they intended:
“… to
distil … a few benchmarks to assess Iraqi compliance. We doubt
whether
it would be
possible to define ‘key tests’ that did not allow Iraq room to
fudge
compliance
or Security Council members room for debate about whether Iraq
was
meeting the
criteria or not. Saddam would be encouraged to continue to dribble
out
concessions
piecemeal rather than offer a step change on co-operation. So far
we
have argued
that without full co-operation from Iraq, specific disarmament
tasks are
at best
irrelevant and at worst allow Saddam off the hook.”
330
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 4 March 2003, ‘Iraq: “Clusters”
Document’.
367