The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
again at
[JAM1] as a man of violence who might develop a more political role
as … he
had growing
doubts about the impact of JAM’s attacks on MNF‑I”.236
442.
On 18 January,
in the first of her weekly reports from Basra (as requested
by
Mr Blair’s
Private Secretary on 8 January), Dr Rosalind Marsden, British
Consul General
in Basra,
set out the need to discuss security and other issues with
appropriate Basra
representatives.237
She
wrote:
“The
reaction of the Provincial Council, Emergency Security Committee
(ESC) and
PDoP
[Provincial Director of Police] to the Jameat operation [on
Christmas Day]
illustrates
the level of fear that JAM have inspired in Basra’s political and
security
leadership.
All three are dysfunctional. With very few exceptions, Provincial
Council
members are
regarded as corrupt, self‑serving, intimidated by the militias
and,
in some
cases, criminal … The PDoP and the ESC are widely regarded here
as
weak and
ineffective. The Governor claims that he has lobbied in Baghdad
for
their removal
…
“The arrest
of Sayid Naji, Basra’s JAM commander, on 18 December has
caused
some
disruption to militant JAM. MND(SE) continue strike operations to
sustain
this
disruptive effect and keep JAM leaders on the run. However, over
the last few
weeks, JAM
have continued to mount IDF and other attacks on MNF … An
American
citizen was
kidnapped on 5 January at a checkpoint north of Basra, almost
certainly
by JAM. The
American is still missing and the two Iraqis who accompanied him
have
been found
dead. Although militant JAM are relatively small in number, they
are
externally
supported and getting more professional.”
443.
The Prime
Minister considered that the weekly report had been “excellent”
and
was looking
forward to more of the same.238
He and the
Senior Officials Group agreed
with
Dr Marsden’s recommendation that she insist on an end to any
boycott of the MNF
before
discussions on preparation for PIC could begin.
444.
Maj Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry:
“… it was
pretty clear to me that … looking over the period as a whole of my
time
in command
– we had a strategy that involved extraction rather than
necessarily
achieving
mission success. It was, in a sense, an exit strategy rather than a
winning
strategy. A
winning strategy was going to require significant additional
resources.”239
236
Minute
senior government official specialising in the Middle East (1) to
Lyall Grant, 9 November 2007,
‘[NAME OF
OPERATION]: Negotiations with JAM in Basrah’.
237
Letter
Marsden to Aldred, 18 January 2007, ‘Basra: Weekly
Report’.
238
Letter
Aldred to Marsden, 23 January 2007, [untitled].
239
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 7.
82