1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
The
Jordan/Iraq trade protocol was worth around US$400m. Smuggling of
non-oil goods
could
produce up to US$150m.
The JIC
stated that, since December 2000, OFF programme exports had halved
as
Baghdad
tried to force oil buyers to pay surcharges of up to US$0.5 a
barrel into
unsupervised
accounts. Most oil companies had refused to pay. The surcharge had
then
been halved
and oil sales had increased.
The JIC
stated that the Iraqi leadership believed that the new US
Administration would be
“unable to
prevent further deterioration” of the UN embargo.
The JIC
stated that there was “broad international consensus to
maintain
the arms
embargo
at least as
long as he [Saddam Hussein] remains in power”. While
there
had been
“some leakage” of air-defence equipment, spares for military
equipment and
armoured
vehicles and dual-use goods, there was “no evidence that major
equipment,
such as
complete weapon systems” had been imported. Saddam Hussein
wanted
“sanctions
lifted because the UN arms embargo has severely limited Iraq’s
capacity to
re‑build
and re-equip its military”.
179.
Mr McKane sent
a final version of the note to Mr Sawers on
15 February.100
180.
The note
stated that, since the 1991 Gulf Conflict, the UK’s policy
objectives
towards
Iraq had been “in the short term to reduce the threat Saddam poses
to the
region,
including by eliminating his WMD programmes; and, in the longer
term, to
reintegrate
a territorially intact Iraq as a law abiding member of the
international
community”.
Those objectives remained valid, although the UK “should
recognise
that we are
unlikely to rid Iraq completely of WMD and avoid presenting this
as
our main
aim”.
181.
The note
summarised the key elements of the policy of containment
as:
“•
WMD
disarmament, through
inspections and monitoring. Since Operation
Desert Fox
and the withdrawal of UNSCOM, this has been on ice …
•
Sanctions,
which have become increasingly controversial. There is
still
widespread
support for the arms embargo, and for controls on dual
use
materials
with plausible application to WMD programmes … But there
is
an
increasing sense that economic sanctions are unfair to the Iraqi
people,
ineffective
as a means of pressuring the regime, and indeed
counter-productive
because
Saddam and his cronies benefit disproportionately from the
smuggling
which
undermines the sanctions …
•
Controls on
Iraq’s oil revenues, through
the UN escrow account and the
Oil‑for‑Food
(OFF) programme. These are important in preventing Saddam
from
diverting
revenue to conventional or WMD re-armament …
•
Military
containment, including
through the No-Fly Zones (NFZs).”
100
Minute
McKane to Sawers, 15 February 2001, ‘Iraq’, attaching Note Cabinet
Office, 15 February 2001,
‘Iraq’.
225