12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
373.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald chaired a meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group
on
13 February.323
A record of
the meeting by Mr Tom Dodd, OD Sec, stated that
“Baghdad
and
Washington were still divided over the future of the ICDC”: General
Abizaid
and
Ambassador Bremer “preferred it becoming an army reserve” as
opposed to
Maj Gen Eikenberry’s
proposed gendarmerie.
374.
According to
the RAND assessment of the Occupation of Iraq,
Ambassador
Bremer
welcomed the proposal to put training of the Iraqi military under
Coalition military
control.324
However, he
was resistant to the proposal that police training should
transfer
to military
responsibility, arguing strongly that policing was a civilian, not
a military,
profession.
375.
The briefing
for the AHMGIR on 1 March stated that the Eikenberry Review
had
identified
“significant shortcomings, particularly with the
police”.325
Delays with
deploying
mentors
(“1,500 international civilian police mentors have not deployed as
planned”)
and
problems with the Jordan training school (which was running at half
capacity)
were
assessed to be due to US funding issues. The UK contribution was
described
as “disproportionate”
and the brief recorded that:
“MND(SE)’s
approach to SSR is considered a model. The British Army is active
in
training
ICDC battalions and the New Iraqi Army. We provide the largest
contingent
of police
trainers in Jordan (72); the UK‑run az‑Zubayr police academy is
now
training
300 police every three weeks; and a group of PSNI [Police Service
of
Northern
Ireland] superintendents are about to deploy to the South to
mentor
provincial
police chiefs. We are also considering contracting around 40
police
advisers as
monitors, expanding the training programme at az‑Zubayr, and
offering
police
leadership training in the UK. The UK will also play a leading role
in the
formation
of the new Iraqi MOD.”
376.
At the meeting
Ministers “noted the Coalition’s work in standing up Iraqi
security
forces and
the UK’s disproportionate contribution to it”.326
377.
Secretary
Rumsfeld accepted Maj Gen Eikenberry’s recommendation
that the US
military
should manage the training of Iraq’s army and
police.327
323
Minute Dodd
to Sheinwald, 16 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy
Group’.
324
Dobbins J,
Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying
Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority.
RAND
Corporation, 2009.
325 Annotated
Agenda, 1 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
326
Minutes, 1
March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
327
Bowen SW
Jr. Hard
Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S.
Government Printing
Office, 2009.
139