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12.1  |  Security Sector Reform
373.  Sir Nigel Sheinwald chaired a meeting of the Iraq Strategy Group on
13 February.323 A record of the meeting by Mr Tom Dodd, OD Sec, stated that “Baghdad
and Washington were still divided over the future of the ICDC”: General Abizaid
and Ambassador Bremer “preferred it becoming an army reserve” as opposed to
Maj Gen Eikenberry’s proposed gendarmerie.
374.  According to the RAND assessment of the Occupation of Iraq, Ambassador
Bremer welcomed the proposal to put training of the Iraqi military under Coalition military
control.324 However, he was resistant to the proposal that police training should transfer
to military responsibility, arguing strongly that policing was a civilian, not a military,
profession.
375.  The briefing for the AHMGIR on 1 March stated that the Eikenberry Review had
identified “significant shortcomings, particularly with the police”.325 Delays with deploying
mentors (“1,500 international civilian police mentors have not deployed as planned”)
and problems with the Jordan training school (which was running at half capacity)
were assessed to be due to US funding issues. The UK contribution was described
as “disproportionate” and the brief recorded that:
“MND(SE)’s approach to SSR is considered a model. The British Army is active in
training ICDC battalions and the New Iraqi Army. We provide the largest contingent
of police trainers in Jordan (72); the UK‑run az‑Zubayr police academy is now
training 300 police every three weeks; and a group of PSNI [Police Service of
Northern Ireland] superintendents are about to deploy to the South to mentor
provincial police chiefs. We are also considering contracting around 40 police
advisers as monitors, expanding the training programme at az‑Zubayr, and offering
police leadership training in the UK. The UK will also play a leading role in the
formation of the new Iraqi MOD.”
376.  At the meeting Ministers “noted the Coalition’s work in standing up Iraqi security
forces and the UK’s disproportionate contribution to it”.326
377.  Secretary Rumsfeld accepted Maj Gen Eikenberry’s recommendation that the US
military should manage the training of Iraq’s army and police.327
323  Minute Dodd to Sheinwald, 16 February 2004, ‘Iraq: Strategy Group’.
324  Dobbins J, Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional
Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009.
325 Annotated Agenda, 1 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
326  Minutes, 1 March 2004, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation meeting.
327  Bowen SW Jr. Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction Experience. U.S. Government Printing
Office, 2009.
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