6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
•
failure to
involve the Shia adequately in a post-Saddam administration;
and
•
failure to
be seen to run the oil industry in the interests of the Iraqi
people.”
Two factors
might work in the UK’s favour:
“•
surviving
networks of influence with whom we could work, including remains
of
state
bureaucracy and food-distribution networks, tribal leaders and
religious
figures;
and
•
receptivity
of the population to information from external media and
leaflet
drops.”
580.
Mr Blair
asked officials for advice on the implications of the JIC
Assessment.247
581.
Mr Cannon
explained that the Cabinet Office and the IPU were
“co-ordinating
policy work
in Whitehall on a range of issues likely to face our forces in
southern Iraq
regardless
of whether there is a formal UK zone of control”.248
The Rock
Drill had
provided an
opportunity to put across the UK’s views on UN involvement and
showed
“the extent
of US determination, at the highest level, to go it alone with
minimal
UN cover”.
582.
Mr Cannon’s
advice did not refer to the comment on the “rudimentary” state of
US
planning
included in the report on the Rock Drill from the British Embassy
Washington,
which was
not received in Whitehall until late on 24 February.
583.
Mr Cannon
provided Mr Blair with a list of IPU activities, drawn from
Mr Chilcott’s
note of 20
February, as an indication of the extent of the work in hand.
Mr Cannon drew
particular
attention to a paper in preparation “outlining our principles and
‘red lines’ for a
post-Saddam
Iraq … for use initially by David Manning with Condi Rice and …
possibly
by you with
President Bush”.
584.
A set of IPU
papers addressing those issues was sent to No.10 on 26
February.
585.
In his
statement to the Inquiry, Mr Blair wrote:
“… what we
anticipated, was not what we found … for example, the JIC report
of
19 February
2003, specifically on the South of Iraq, says the risks were
refugees,
environmental
damage and the impact of CBW strikes.”249
586.
Mr Blair
subsequently told the Inquiry:
“The
benefit of the South was that it was Shia absolutely predominantly.
So I felt
we were
going to be in an Area of Operation where it was frankly going to
be
easier for
us …
247
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 24 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq:
Aftermath Issues’.
248
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 24 February 2003, ‘Southern Iraq:
Aftermath Issues’.
249
Statement,
14 January 2011, page 14.
413