3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
441.
Mr Annan
concluded that there were real differences on strategy and
timing
in the
Security Council. Iraq’s non-co-operation was insufficient to bring
members
to agree
that war was justified; they would only move if they came to their
own
judgement
that inspections were pointless.
442.
The UKMIS New
York record of a meeting between Mr Straw and
Mr Annan
reported
that they had discussed the fact that the majority of Council
members
remained unpersuaded
by the US and UK arguments.112
The strong
probability of
Iraqi
non-co-operation was not sufficient to bring them to agree that war
was justified.
There were
real differences on strategy and timing and Council members would
only
move if
they came to their own judgement that inspections were
pointless.
443.
Mr Straw
had commented that Saddam Hussein’s behaviour would be
quite
different
if he really had zero WMD. The UK and US would look at the timing
of a
second
resolution. The Council was more likely to be brought to a decision
if we stuck
to the game
plan, but we also had to do the political arithmetic. The Americans
would
find it
difficult to move forward if the Council majority really believed
the inspections
were working.
444.
A separate
record produced by the FCO reported that Mr Straw had
commented
that the
public saw 200,000 troops in the region and heard belligerent
language and
thought we
were determined to go to war tomorrow without good
reason.113
He
and
Mr Annan
had discussed the need to keep the pressure on Saddam Hussein;
and
that the
threat of force could be more effective than its use. There was a
possibility of
building a
consensus with time but if the pace was forced there was a risk of
one or
more
vetoes. The problem was that the burden of evidence had shifted to
those who
wanted
military action. The fact that resolution 1441 required Iraqi
compliance was lost.
Time was
needed to get people to look at things differently, but different
countries faced
different
time pressures. American time was very expensive; others felt it
was natural to
ask for
more time. When asked to define “a little time”, Dr Blix had
answered “one year”.
445.
Asked by the
Inquiry whether, after the report on 27 January, he had
expected
Dr Blix
to be firm in his determination of a material breach, Mr Blair
stated:
“… the
whole point was that his [Dr Blix’s] view was that Iraq was
complying
somewhat,
but not fully and unconditionally, and as time went on, I
became
increasingly
alarmed … that we were just back into a game-playing situation
with
Saddam … I
think it is very clear from what we now know that he never had
any
intention
of his people co‑operating fully with the
inspectors.”114
112
Telegram
268 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 15 February 2003, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with the
UN Secretary-General: 14 February’.
113
Telegram 92
FCO London to UKMIS New York, 15 February 2003, ‘Foreign
Secretary’s Meeting
with UN
Secretary General, New York, 14 February’.
114
Public
hearing, 29 January 2010, page 108.
259