The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
385.
The Chiefs of
Staff had concerns about the difficulties for any land
operations
posed by
the timescales and logistics. That would need to be “set against
the
Prime Minister’s
desire to be supportive”.
386.
Mr Hoon’s
Private Office was concerned about the weakness of the
coalition
elements
and post‑conflict plans, and advised Mr Hoon that his meeting
should focus
on what
would “allow participation in planning to continue”.
387.
The MOD has
been unable to locate any record of Mr Hoon’s meeting
on
388.
The DIS
reported on 22 July that the US was “no better off than we are
about
actionable
intelligence on WMD.178
Sites
formerly used for the production of WMD
were known,
but there was “little intelligence on whether they are currently in
use or on
possible
new locations”. The whereabouts of potential storage sites was “a
top priority
but no
significant success was reported”.
389.
The Cabinet
Office paper ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ was
issued
on 19 July,
to inform Mr Blair’s 23 July meeting with Mr Straw,
Mr Hoon,
Lord Goldsmith
(the Attorney General) and key officials to discuss
Iraq.
390.
The purpose
of the Cabinet Office paper was to identify the conditions
which
would be
necessary before military action would be justified and the UK
could
participate
in such action; and to provide the basis for a discussion with the
US
about
creating those conditions.
391.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that Mr Blair had said at Crawford that
the
UK would
support military action to bring about regime change, provided
certain
conditions
were met.
392.
The Cabinet
Office paper, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’, was issued
on
19 July
to those who would be attending a meeting to be chaired by
Mr Blair on
393.
Ministers were
invited to note the latest position on US military planning,
the
timescales
for possible action, and to agree:
•
The
objective for military action, as set out in Mr Hoon’s minute
to Mr Blair
of
31 May, of “a stable and law‑abiding Iraq within the present
borders,
co‑operating
with the international community, no longer posing a threat
to
177
Letter MOD
Iraq Inquiry Unit to Iraq Inquiry Secretariat, 23 May 2012,
[untitled].
178
Minute DCDI
to PSO/CDS, 22 July 2002, ‘Iraqi Capabilities’.
179
Paper
Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military
Action’.
234