The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
The review
identified the strategies that DFID had pursued to improve
project
performance:
•
constant
monitoring and management (though that was hampered by
insecurity);
•
using
innovative techniques to deliver projects, such as working through
local
Iraqi
engineers and helping the Ministry of Finance to set up an office
inside the
International
Zone (within which international consultants could
work);
•
using the
fragile states analysis to focus on a few immediate priorities. In
Iraq,
DFID had
focused on strengthening central Government and getting
economic
reform on
track;
•
systematically
tracking poor performance;
•
adapting
delivery methods to inside fiduciary risk;
•
building clear
exit strategies into projects, including dedicating significant
effort to
leveraging
in other donors; and
•
working
closely with Whitehall.
515.
Mr Asquith
advised the 7 April meeting of the ISG that following rocket
attacks
on Basra
Palace on 4 April, and given the continuing non-co-operation by the
local
authorities
in Basra with UK officials following the Jameat incident, some UK
civilian
staff were
unable to operate.296
The FCO and
DFID planned to recommend to their
Ministers a
drawdown of civilian staff from Basra Palace until conditions on
the
ground had
improved.
516.
Mr Benn
was briefed on 19 April that significant numbers of Shia were
moving
south and
Sunnis moving north.297
MND(SE) was
providing some (unspecified)
short‑term
support to Internally Displaced People (IDPs).
517.
Mr Benn
was also briefed that running costs for the Basra PRT continued to
be
a “major
sticking point”. No government department (or other country) had a
budget
for this.
The Post-Conflict Reconstruction Unit (PCRU) was “holding the
fort”, and
departments
were exploring whether they might be able to continue leading in
the
longer term.
518.
Late on 21
April, four months after the December 2005 elections, the United
Iraqi
Alliance
announced the selection of Mr Nuri al-Maliki as its candidate
for Prime Minister
519.
The British
Embassy Baghdad reported on 22 April that the new
Government
had
produced a “100-day plan”, focusing on urgent measures to improve
security, oil,
electricity,
employment, agriculture and housing.299
296
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 10 April 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group: 7 April 2006’.
297
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS [DFID], 19 April 2006, ‘DOP(I) Briefing 19
April 2006’.
298
eGram
13011/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Formation of
the New Government:
Al-Maliki
Nominated by UIA as Prime Minister’.
299
eGram
13036/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 22 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Preparations
for Government’.
282