The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
613.
Secretary
Powell wrote in 2012:
“In January
2003, as war with Iraq was approaching, we needed to present our
case
against
Iraq to the public and the international community. By then the
President
did not
think that war could be avoided. He had crossed the line in his own
mind,
even though
the NSC [National Security Council] had never met – and never
would
meet – to
discuss the decision.”208
614.
Following the
debate at the UN on 20 January, Sir David Manning spoke
again
to
Dr Rice.209
He reported
that opinion polls in the UK showed that “over 60 percent”
of
those
questioned would “accept” military action if mandated by a second
UN resolution,
but the
figures “plummeted to near single figures without one”. He reported
that he had
been
assured that the US Administration wanted a second
resolution.
615.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock advised that the “vast majority” of the
Security
Council
believed that the inspectors should be given more time, although
many
were also
sceptical of Iraqi co‑operation.
616.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock chaired an informal discussion of Security
Council
members on
21 January, which he described as to report on the discussion
between
Dr Blix
and Mr Blair on 17 January. Sir Jeremy had stated that
the UK continued to feed
the
inspectors with information on a “one way basis” and there was a
“good chance”
that, as
the inspectors got closer to Iraq’s proscribed activities, more
information would
come out of
the system:
“Iraq was
therefore taking an amazing risk by trying to conceal its WMD.
The
Iraqis had
to realise that there was only one way to avoid complete
disarmament
through
military action – much more pro‑active co‑operation. If they did
not provide
that
co‑operation they would themselves be choosing to realise the
threat of
617.
Sir Jeremy
reported that Ambassador Negroponte had stated that the
situation
could not
be allowed to drag on; and that he was talking about days, not
weeks or
months. It
was for Iraq to prove to the Council it was complying, not the
other way
round. The
French Deputy Permanent Representative had argued that simply
saying
that
co‑operation was insufficient was not enough; demonstrable, precise
evidence
was needed
to justify war, not become a prisoner of the military build‑up.
That could
be hours,
but it could also be months or years.
618.
Sir Jeremy
stated that the “vast majority” of Security Council members
believed
that
“inspections should be given more time, although many are also
sceptical of
Iraqi co‑operation”.
208
Powell C
with Koltz T. It Worked
for Me: In Life and Leadership. Harper
Perennial, 2012.
209
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Conversation with
Condi Rice’.
210
Telegram
121 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 22 January 2003, ‘Iraq: Informal
Meeting of Security
Council
Members’.
108