The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
745.
On the way
back to the UK after the visit, Sir Nigel Sheinwald sent
Mr Hadley a
note for
President Bush from Mr Blair.364
It
said:
“I left
Iraq, on balance, more optimistic not less … The Government
obviously has
a real
sense of mission. Not one [member of the government] … said we
should
go now …
All want us to stay to get the job done. If
we have a
clear plan, properly
executed
and communicated to the Iraqi people, we will succeed.
“Now for
the challenge: the nature of the insurgency is changing; we do not,
on our
own, have
the force capability to defeat it; as the Sunni become convinced we
are
non-sectarian,
they welcome it and conversely as the more extreme Shia come
to
the same
conclusion, they don’t. Hence Basra becoming a problem. In
addition,
very simply
put: the security is so bad in and around Baghdad for ordinary
folk, that
it stops
improvement in services, we get blamed (in part) and people start
looking
to militias
to protect them. Al Qaida kill Shia. Shia kill Sunni, and sectarian
violence
increases.”
746.
Mr Blair
set out five suggestions for a plan to draw together and focus
effort in Iraq
to address
the “vicious spiral” described above:
•
publishing
a conditional timetable for withdrawal of the MNF;
•
a “better,
stronger ISF build-up”;
•
prioritising
Baghdad security and electricity production;
•
doing deals
with the insurgents to enter the political process;
and
•
shaming the
international community into supporting the new Iraqi
Government,
through a
big UN-led donor conference.
747.
The day after
leaving Iraq, Sir Nigel Sheinwald wrote to Mr Straw’s
Principal
Private
Secretary to set out Mr Blair’s view of priorities for Iraq,
which mirrored the
suggestions
he sent to President Bush.365
The key
elements included:
“– Drawing
up a timetable
with conditions setting out
the potential path to
MNF
withdrawal. This should address the desire of Iraqis for clarity
over two
issues:
that the MNF will stay until Iraqi security forces are capable of
acting
independently;
and that the MNF will go once that has been achieved.
Any
timetable
should include dates, but each one should be conditional on
ISF
build‑up of
capability and overall violence levels … Action:
The Prime Minister
will
discuss with President Bush in Washington. Thereafter
MOD/BE
Baghdad/FCO.
–– To
ensure improved ISF
build-up. We need
to make sure that Iraqi forces really
are capable
of dealing with the threat, including from AQ … The Prime
Minister
heard a
number of disquieting comments on this score from Iraqis and
others.
364
Letter
Sheinwald to Hadley, 22 May 2006, ‘Iraq’, attaching
Note TB [Blair to Bush], 22 May 2006, ‘Note’.
365
Letter
Sheinwald to Hayes, 23 May 2006, ‘Iraq’.
612