3.5 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002
–
the
negotiation of resolution 1441
647.
Lord Goldsmith
explained that his telephone call to Mr Straw had been
“prompted”
when he had
learned of Mr Blair’s statement to President Bush (on 14
October) that he
would join
the US in acting without a second Security Council
resolution:
“I thought
that such action by the UK would be unlawful and I felt strongly
that there
had to be
recognition within government of the constraints under which we
were
acting, and
we should not lead the US to believe that we would take action … I
knew
too that if
we boxed ourselves into a corner that would make my task when I
came
to advise
on the effect of the resolution more difficult.”209
648.
Lord Goldsmith
confirmed that Mr Straw had persuaded him not to provide a
note
of advice
until he (Lord Goldsmith) had seen Mr Blair.210
Mr Straw
had said that there
might be
circumstances in which the UK could proceed without a second
resolution, for
example if
Russia exercised a veto unreasonably. Lord Goldsmith wrote that
although he
“was not
persuaded by that example … it did make sense to him to have a
discussion
with the
Prime Minister … before putting his advice in
writing”.
649.
Intense
discussions on the elements of a draft resolution
continued.
650.
Reporting a
discussion on 16 October, Sir Christopher Meyer wrote that
Mr Sandy
Berger,
President Clinton’s National Security Advisor, thought that an
attack on Iraq
would be
“very risky” and might destabilise a number of countries in the
region. In
addition,
he “thought that, whatever the scenario, the British Government has
got itself
into the
position where it would go with the US whatever the circumstances.
‘The die
651.
Sir
Christopher also reported that Mr Berger could envisage a
situation where
UNMOVIC
might find “something nasty” and the US “would want to go to war”,
but
others on
the Security Council would say that it “showed inspections were
working and
that they
should continue”.
652.
Sir David
Manning commented to Mr Powell that that was “an inherent risk
in the
UN route”;
and that: “Other routes were even riskier.”212
653.
Mr Blair
and Mr Annan discussed the need to bring the discussions on
a
new
resolution to a successful conclusion for all concerned on 17
October.213
They
agreed
that: “If the UN handled this well, it would emerge stronger, and
reinforce the
international
rule of law.”
209
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 2.3.
210
Statement,
4 January 2011, paragraph 2.8.
211
Letter
Meyer to Manning, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Berger’s
Views’.
212
Manuscript
comment Manning to Powell, 18 October 2002, on Letter Meyer to
Manning,
17 October
2002, ‘Iraq: [US individual’s] Views’.
213
Letter
Wechsberg to McDonald, 17 October 2002, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s
Telephone Call
with UN
Secretary General’.
315