4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
45.
In February
2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq was covertly working on
long
range
missile systems, but it would be unable to achieve an operational
capability
while
sanctions remained effective.
46.
Based on
one recent intelligence report, the JIC suggested for the first
time
that Iraq
might have assembled “up to 20” Al Hussein missiles.
47.
The JIC issued
an updated Assessment of the “long range ballistic missile
intentions
and
capabilities of North Korea, Iran, Iraq and Libya and their likely
development over
the next
10-15 years” on 9 February 2001.21
Those four
countries were the only states
currently
developing long range ballistic missiles (with ranges over 1,000km)
which were
of concern
to the UK.
48.
The Assessment
stated that North Korea was the main proliferator of ballistic
missile
technology.
It also stated that Iran was developing long range missiles as part
of what
was judged
to be a regional policy to deter other actors, including
Iraq.
49.
In its Key
Judgements relevant to Iraq, the JIC stated:
“•
At present,
none of them intends to attack the UK and only
North Korea has
a
clear
intent to develop a
capability to reach the
US. But their
intentions could
change
quickly. Our assessments must therefore concentrate on
capabilities,
including
both worst case
engineering judgements and best
estimates of the
likely
timeframes of their
acquisition of usable … missiles.
•
Iraq is
covertly developing
ballistic missiles that
are beyond the
150km
range
permitted … It could
also be in the early
stages of developing
a two
stage system
with a possible range of 2,000km. If
successful, this would
significantly
increase the threat Saddam poses in the region and could, in
the
longer
term, be developed to become a threat to the UK and US. At
present,
however,
Iraq’s missile
programmes are
constrained
by sanctions.
While
they remain
effective, it is unlikely
that Iraq could achieve an operational
long range
capability.”
50.
The JIC
Assessment stated:
•
Iraq was
“known to
want a capability to target Israel and Iran, and would
like to
acquire a capability to reach the rest of the Gulf ”;
and its “strategic
objectives”
would “probably remain the same whether or not the
current
Government
remains in power”.
•
The JIC did
“not know” whether an Iraqi Government “would aim to
target
Western
Europe or the US, but it would be a credible deterrent
objective
for Saddam”.
21
JIC
Assessment, 9 February 2001, ‘Long Range Ballistic Missile
Threat’.
21