The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
the Joint
Commander could seek Ministerial approval to conduct operations
under
International
Humanitarian Law.
1148.
On 30 June,
the JIC issued an Assessment covering the overall security
situation
1149.
The JIC judged
that “the recent spike of activity by anti-Government forces is
a
deliberate
attempt to undermine the political process”. The early handover may
have
avoided the
transfer “being marked by a surge of violence”.
1150.
On 24 June,
there had been a series of attacks in Baqubah, Ramadi and
Mosul
which the
JIC assessed were “probably co-ordinated”. The JIC
assessed:
“Al-Zarqawi
had claimed responsibility for some … but the extent of his
planning
and
direction is unclear. If he was behind the attacks, the breadth and
scale would
represent a
step change.”
1151.
The JIC
assessed that the threat from Muqtada al-Sadr was declining,
with
indications
of splits in JAM in Baghdad.
1152.
The JIC judged
that:
“The level
of violence will diminish if the Iraqi Interim Government is able
visibly to
establish a
credible degree of independence of action, deal with security,
improve
economic
and social conditions, so gaining popular support. But Islamist
terrorist
attacks
will remain a threat.”
652
JIC
Assessment, 30 June 2004, ‘Iraq Security’.
396