6.5 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, January to
March 2003
•
“Second
UNSCR and clear humanitarian mandate.” DFID would want to
be
“positively
engaged” with the UK military, US humanitarian effort and the
UN.
It would
also “consider bilateral operations in any UK sector”, but
commitments
to UN
agencies across Iraq and the region would “severely financially
constrain
what we
could do in a UK-controlled sector with the UK military and
other
partners”.
•
“Second
UNSCR, clear humanitarian mandate and additional
resources.”
With adequate
finances, DFID “would be able to play the exemplary
role
suggested
by the Prime Minister”. Without, DFID could discuss with the
MOD
what the
exemplary role might entail, but could not plan for it “without
more
comfort on
resources”.
646.
Dr Brewer
stated that DFID staff were committed to advising the MOD and
Armed
Forces in
all circumstances and that MOD-DFID links were now strong. DFID was
also
doing
“scoping work” on the role it might play if there were a UN
mandate:
“But we do
not currently have political authority to deploy operationally, or
to
make substantive
plans to deploy in an exemplary role (eg commissioning
or
pre-positioning
material). Our Secretary of State has made our financial
position
clear in
two letters to the Prime Minister.”
647.
Dr Brewer’s
letter illustrated the absence of an agreed UK approach to
the
provision
of humanitarian relief, highlighting the gap between DFID’s focus
on
supporting
the UN, Red Cross and NGOs across Iraq and the UK military’s
focus
on the
humanitarian situation in its Area of Operations (AO) in the
South.
648.
MOD
officials expressed growing concern about UK preparations for
the
delivery of
humanitarian assistance and longer-term reconstruction in the
South.
649.
On 26
February, Mr David Johnson, Head of the MOD Iraq Secretariat,
expressed
concern to
Mr Hoon’s Private Office about humanitarian assistance during
the early
stages of
military conflict.280
The MOD and
DFID believed US plans for humanitarian
assistance
were inadequate, in particular because they relied on delivery by
NGOs,
which would
not be there in numbers early on. The UK military would therefore
need:
“…
immediate access to sufficient expertise and resources to … make
good the
deficiencies
in the US plans. In particular … DFID experts deployed in theatre,
who
can advise
what is actually required … (as opposed to soldiers making it up as
they
go along) …
There are lead-times associated with this … Waiting till after a
second
SCR is
leaving it too late. We know DFID haven’t got any money. That is
why they
need to ask
for some, now.”
280
Email
sec(O)-Iraq to sofs-ps [MOD], 26 February 2003, ‘Humanitarian
Assistance’.
425