The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

604.  The Inquiry has seen evidence that temporary promotion was widely used in the

MOD as an additional incentive for recruitment of volunteers.

605.  In late 2007, Mr Jon Day, MOD Director General Operational Policy, commented

unfavourably on the large number of MOD civilians given “T&G [temporary and

geographical] promotion well above their grade”.395

606.  Participants at the civilian outreach event suggested that, between 2007 and 2009,

it had become more difficult to recruit suitable candidates. There was concern that

availability rather than suitability became the deciding factor, and that some posts had

been overgraded to attract applicants.

607.  The US also experienced difficulty filling positions in Iraq.

608.  In June 2004, the US General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that the CPA

“had generally operated with about one‑third of its direct positions vacant”.396 Reasons

suggested for the shortfall included the hardship of the posting, the security situation

and budgetary constraints.

609.  The RAND history of the CPA stated that the CPA suffered severe shortages of

trained and experienced personnel throughout its existence, with a number of sectors,

including police and justice, “chronically undermanned”.397 Contributory factors included

rapid staff turnover, the CPA’s inability to keep track of the staff it had, and its failure

to identify requirements still to be met.

610.  In January 2006, the Office of the Special Inspector for Iraq Reconstruction

concluded that a number of circumstances had inhibited effective workforce

planning, including:

• the wide‑ranging role of the CPA;

• the CPA’s temporary status;

• deteriorating security;

• inaccurate pre‑conflict assumptions about Iraq’s bureaucracy;

• limited sources of personnel;

• constantly changing requirements; and

• inconsistent inter‑agency co‑ordination.398

395  Minute DG Op Pol to 2nd PUS [MOD], 9 November 2007, ‘MOD Civilians in Operational Theatres’.

396  Rebuilding Iraq. Resource, Security, Governance, Essential Services, and Oversight Issues,

US General Accounting Office Report to Congressional Committees, June 2004, page 39.

397  Dobbins J, Jones SG, Runkle B & Mohandas S. Occupying Iraq: A History of the Coalition Provisional

Authority. RAND Corporation, 2009.

398  Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, January 2006, Iraq Reconstruction, Lessons in

Human Capital Management.

350