12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
719.
A junior DFID
official emailed the FCO on 14 July to say that DFID felt that
the
strategy
could not be agreed across Whitehall.657
He wrote:
“We see your paper as
something
that we have tried very hard to inform and influence, but have
failed. It’s way
off
something that we would wish to put our name to.” He suggested that
it was instead
presented
as an FCO‑led document.
720.
On the same
day, Commander Simon Huntingdon, MOD, emailed the FCO to
say
that the
MOD also did not feel the strategy represented an agreed FCO, DFID
and MOD
position on
policing in Iraq.658
721.
On 18 July,
MOD, DFID and FCO officials met to discuss policing in
Iraq.659
They
agreed that
the strategy could not be viewed as “complete and usable” until
additional
information
was sent by the British Embassy. The minutes recorded:
“In the
meantime, we should avoid giving the impression that policing was
on track
when the
reality was that we did not know.”
722.
The group
agreed that a background paper on the strategy should be
submitted
to senior
officials on 22 July and possibly to Ministers afterwards. A
second
cross‑departmental
paper would be submitted by the end of August outlining
the
intended
“end state” for the IPS, including “a route map of how to get
there”, an analysis
of the
risks (such as the sustainability of policing) and “an indication
of the resources
required”.
While the FCO accepted that it led policing activity in Iraq, it
“stressed” the
need for
all relevant departments to agree the papers; there was a “shared
responsibility
for
delivering policing”.
723.
Commenting on
the draft background paper, an FCO junior official
described
policing as
“the Cinderella of SSR”.660
The
“reasons/factors” for that included:
•
“The
insurgency broke the original plan, but no‑one was prepared to
admit it.”
•
“The
international policing community has not responded adequately to
Iraq” –
even the
reduced figure of 1,500 (from 6,000) International Police
Liaison
Officers
(IPLOs) had not been achieved.
•
As the US
was “the monopoly supplier of assets and people”, its “military
vision
[had]
prevailed”.
•
“The
original vision of the Iraqi police force as a community based
service is
(and was)
idealistic pie‑in‑the‑sky. It does not fit with the culture or
environment.”
•
The Iraqis
were seeking to balance the police against the army to
prevent
a coup.
657
Email DFID
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 14 July 2005, ‘Cover
note to Strategy Group’.
658
Email
Huntingdon to FCO [junior official], 14 July 2005, ‘Police
Cross‑Departmental Strategy’.
659
Minutes
FCO, 18 July 2005, ‘Cross‑Departmental Meeting on Policing in Iraq
– 18 July 2005’.
660
Email FCO
[junior official] to FCO [junior official], 21 July 2005,
‘Background paper on police’.
217