The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
132.
On 23 August,
at the request of the Iraq Senior Officials Group, the JIC
looked
specifically
at the threat posed by militias in Iraq, their popular support and
the prospects
for
disarmament, de‑mobilisation and reintegration.96
It
judged:
“Violence
in Iraq is part of a vicious cycle: deteriorating security has led
to a
proliferation
of militias, in turn fuelling further violence. The threat from
these armed
groups is
multi‑dimensional. The scale is difficult to judge … Many are
sectarian
based … and
are competing with the Iraqi state’s security forces to provide
security
and
protection for their own communities … Some elements are engaged in
violent
attacks
against their political and sectarian opponents and coalition
forces; others
are also
involved in criminality … Weapons are readily
available.
“Most Iraqi
political parties across the sectarian spectrum maintain a militia
of some
sort. Some,
including the Kurdish Peshmerga, pose no immediate military threat
to
the
Multinational Forces (MNF) or Iraqi internal stability … But
elements of Muqtada
al‑Sadr’s
Jaysh al‑Mahdi (JAM) are driving sectarian violence and attacking
the
MNF. In
some cases, the distinction between the militias and Iraqi Security
Forces
(ISF) is
blurred.”
133.
The Assessment
included a table listing the size of the main militias in Iraq.
The
JIC judged
that the largest group was the Kurdish Peshmerga with 80,000 –
90,000
members,
followed by the Badr Corps with 10,000 – 13,000 members and JAM
with
10,000
members.
“Iraqi
political commitment for more vigorous action – against JAM in
particular –
is uncertain
… We judge Maliki is … unable to confront the militias, fearing a
violent
backlash
that would threaten the break‑up of the Shia political coalition
(the UIA).
We continue
to judge that any perception among JAM that a widespread
assault
against
them had begun, particularly if fronted by the MNF, would provoke
fierce
resistance.
It would also increase Shia hostility to the coalition: the
inability of the
MNF and ISF
to protect them against Sunni extremists has meant that many
Shia
regard JAM
as their defenders, particularly in mixed areas.”
135.
On 24 August,
advice on Op SALAMANCA, including a request for approval
of
a temporary
uplift of 360 troops, was sent to Mr Browne.97
136.
The advice
explained that the operation:
“•
Is a plan
to improve Basra through operations, high impact reconstruction
and
SSR
commencing in mid‑September and lasting for up to six
months;
96
JIC
Assessment, 23 August 2006, ‘Iraq: The Problem with
Militias’.
97
Minute
Burke‑Davies to APS/Secretary of State [MOD], 24 August 2006,
‘Iraq: Op SALAMANCA’.
28