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9.5  |  June 2006 to 27 June 2007
predominance in the UIA, will focus his efforts on co‑opting those elements of the
Sadrist movement he believes can be persuaded to support the political process –
indeed may need to take greater risks with those whose loyalties are undecided …”
661.  On 8 March, Dr Howells updated DOP(I) on finalisation of the Better Basra Plan
and the process for implementing it.345 It would be circulated out of committee for
Ministers “to note”.
662.  The MOD briefing for Mr Browne, who chaired the meeting, stated that the move
to Basra Air Station would “impact significantly on the range of activity the FCO and the
PRT can carry out” and encouraged him to ask:
“Post re‑posturing, will it be possible to deliver the effort required [on police
training and reform] from Basra Air Station and the Warren?”346
“Will FCO be able to achieve the level of local political engagement required,
particularly over the critical period when UK forces are re‑posturing?”347
663.  DOP(I) also discussed a paper on the humanitarian situation in Iraq and concluded
that the UK should lobby the UN, the Red Cross and others to step up their actions to
address it.348
664.  An FCO paper on the Iraqi judicial system was also tabled.349 It raised issues
with a backlog of thousands of pre‑trial detainees and with interference in judicial
independence.
665.  The Attorney General told the meeting that the importance of the rule of law could
not be overstated and agreed to visit Iraq as proposed by the FCO.350
666.  Also on 8 March, Maj Gen Shaw wrote in his weekly report:
“It is clear that the [NIIA] raid was both legal and, in tactical targeting terms, a
good call … Within the context of the wider politics of Iraq and with the benefit of
hindsight, however, the operation was ill‑judged. Local political reaction has been
relatively muted … My sense though is that, locally, the desire for progress and
transition remains and this should motivate them to treat this incident more as a
speed bump than an obstacle …”351
345  Minutes, 8 March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
346  See Section 12.1 for a description of the Warren site.
347  Minute Fern to SofS‑PSSC [MOD], 7 March 2007, ‘Defence and Overseas Policy Sub‑Committee on
Iraq – (DOP(I)) – Steering Brief’.
348  Minutes, 8 March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
349  Paper IPU/Bagdad Embassy, 6 March 2007, ‘The Iraqi Judicial System’.
350  Minutes, 8 March 2007, DOP(I) meeting.
351  Minute Shaw to CJO, 8 March 2007, ‘GOC MND(SE) – Southern Iraq Update – 8 March 2007’.
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