The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
secure the
North and protect/stabilise the Kurds. Then effectively with huge
force we
go on to
Baghdad.”
“We would
support in any way we can.
“On timing,
we could start building up after the break. A strike date could be
Jan/Feb
next year.
But the crucial issue is not when, but how.”
452.
In response
to Mr Blair’s request for full details of the proposed
military
campaign
and possible UK contributions, the MOD advised No.10 on 26
July:
•
US military
planning was still evolving and the Chiefs of Staff were not
yet
able to
judge whether the US had a winning concept.
•
Three
possible options were identified but no recommendation was
made
about which
option should be selected.
•
The largest
option comprised the deployment of a division, but the
MOD
was also
examining the possibility of deploying an additional light
brigade
and
providing the framework for a UK‑led Corps
headquarters.
453.
Mr Hoon
expressed caution about both the robustness of the
estimates
of the
timescales for a UK deployment and the impact of Operation FRESCO
–
potential
industrial action by the Fire Brigades Union in the
autumn.
454.
Mr Hoon’s
view was that the UK should present its options to the
US
positively,
but without commitment at that stage.
455.
Mr Blair
was advised that no decision was needed at that stage.
456.
The three
options identified by the MOD, which made no explicit
reference
to possible
post‑conflict commitments, provided the broad framework
for
discussions
until the end of 2002.
457.
Following
Mr Blair’s meeting on 23 July, Mr Watkins commissioned
further work,
including a
paper on all aspects of the military options for Mr Hoon to
send to Mr Blair
in time for
his weekend box: a paper on military preparations, including the
impact of
the
firefighters’ strike; and a draft script for
Maj Gen Wilson to use at the CENTCOM
meeting on
1 to 2 August.195
195
Minute
Watkins to PSO/CDS, 23 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
244