The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
715.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock reported that he had agreed with his US and
Spanish
colleagues
to tell the press “late the following morning” that there was
no
prospect of
putting the resolution to a vote, and blaming France.
716.
After the
Azores Summit, Sir David Manning spoke to Sir Jeremy Greenstock
to
ask him to
phone his Security Council colleagues that evening to establish
whether there
had been
any change in their positions on the draft
resolution.246
717.
Sir Jeremy
Greenstock subsequently reported that the UK Mission in New
York
had spoken
to all Security Council colleagues with the message
that:
“… there
was now a short time left to consider whether the Council could
agree at
last on an
ultimatum to Saddam which, if he did not fulfil it, would result in
serious
consequences.
If their respective governments were in a position to engage in
such
a
discussion, I would need to hear it as early as possible on 17
March. When asked
(as the
majority did), I said that I had no (no) instructions as to whether
to put the
718.
Sir Jeremy
commented that the French and Russians did not like the
message.
Mr de
La Sablière had claimed that the French had moved significantly
over the last two
days as
President Chirac’s interview would show. The “undecided 6” were
“only slightly
more
positive”.
719.
Sir Jeremy
also reported that he had agreed with his American and
Spanish
counterparts
to tell the press during the “late morning” of 17 March that there
was
“no prospect
of putting our resolution to the vote, casting heavy blame on the
French”.
The key
elements of the statement should be:
“(a) the
Azores Summit had called for a last effort to see if the Council
could unite
around an
ultimatum;
(b) having
contacted every member it was clear that Council consensus was
not
possible
within the terms of 1441, given the determination of one country
in
particular
to block any ultimatum;
(c) we
would therefore not be pursuing a vote;
(d) the
Azores communiqué had made clear the positions of our
governments
on the
way forward.”
720.
Sir Jeremy
informed Mr Annan and Dr Blix that he would be receiving
final
instructions
“eg on whether to stop pursuing the resolution on the morning
[Eastern
Standard
Time] of 17 March”.
246
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 16 March 2014, ‘Iraq: Summit Meeting in the
Azores: 16 March’.
247
Telegram
452 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 17 March 2003, ‘Iraq:
Developments on 16 March’.
526