3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
it with the
Americans. They were likely to bring it to us. I think there’s a
distinction
322.
Mr Straw
confirmed that he had seen the second and third papers sent to
No.10.157
Mr Straw
wrote that his comments were based on the two papers taken together
and
that from
his perspective SIS4’s reference to the need for assurances of
legality were:
“… spelling
out quite plainly that ‘assurances of legality’ were an
essential
pre‑condition
to any HMG policy in support of UK military action with the
objective
of regime
change.”
323.
Mr Straw
emphasised that one of the central arguments against regime
change
was, as the
FCO advice of 3 December and SIS4’s paper had made clear, “the
fact
that it
was illegal”.
324.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed future options for Iraq
on
3 December
2001.
325.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that he was not opposed to the removal
of
Saddam
Hussein, but an extremely clever plan would be needed.
326.
Mr Blair
suggested the visit to Washington by Sir David Manning
and
Sir Richard
Dearlove later that week would be an opportunity to share
thinking
on the
next phase.
327.
Mr Blair spoke
to President Bush by telephone on 3 December.158
328.
The
conversation was primarily about the position in Afghanistan,
including the
prospects
for the Bonn Conference to generate a request for an international
security
force,
possibly under UN auspices, and whether the UK might lead such a
force.
329.
In a
discussion on future options in relation to Iraq, Mr Blair told
President Bush
that Sir
David Manning and Sir Richard Dearlove would be in Washington
later
that week.
That would be an opportunity to share thinking on “how the next
phase
might
proceed”.
330.
In response to
a discussion about the potential effects in the Middle East
if
Saddam
Hussein were overthrown, Mr Blair said that:
“… contrary
to press reporting, he was not in a different place on this … it
would
be
excellent to get rid of Saddam. But there needed to be a clever
strategy for
doing
this.”
156
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 15.
157
Statement,
16 March 2011, page 1.
158
Letter
Tatham to McDonald, 3 December 2001, ‘Telephone Conversation with
President Bush’.
367