9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
672.
Lt Gen Lamb
observed that if the MNF were unable to sustain the
security
initiative,
the population would inevitably look to JAM for their future
protection.
Separately,
he noted that the US was planning to send an additional 2,200
Military
Police to
Iraq to help with the expected additional prisoners resulting from
Operation
Fardh
al‑Qanoon.
673.
In relation to
the NIIA raid, Lt Gen Lamb reported that:
“The
political aftermath of the Basra incident continues to play high in
Baghdad a
week after
the event. Whatever the rights and wrongs, the facts or
speculation …
the
incident … lit the touch paper on an issue that has been gaining
increasing
importance
ever since May 2006 – that of Iraqi sovereignty and dignity. It is
one that,
above all,
the Prime Minister [Maliki] has invested significant personal
capital in,
and … will
affect all our relationships and authorities throughout 2007 –
seeing them
becoming
increasingly restricted … Even with our most comfortable of
interlocutors,
the feeling
has been of deep embarrassment and anger. So unless we ensure,
both
at home and
in‑theatre, that the coalition are operating within the GOI’s
bounds of
acceptable
behaviour and sovereignty, we will find ourselves with much to
lose.
Consequently,
I sense, the mid‑year UNSCR review has the potential to be
a
significantly
more important event than it was last time round.”
674.
Gen Petraeus
told Mr McDonald that the NIIA operation “continued to
cause
ripples”.356
Things had
gone wrong and there were lessons to be learned, but he
was
“broadly
content” with the UK’s plans for re‑posturing in Basra, having been
reassured
by contact
with No.10.
675.
In his weekly
report of 15 March, Maj Gen Shaw reflected:
“If we are
to address the Iraqi end‑state, our focus needs to be less on the
90 percent
violence
against us, more on the 10 percent reported inter‑Shia/Iraqi
violence which
threatens
stability when we are gone. Tackling death squad leaders … who
pose the
major
threat to the political stability of Basra, is the most useful
application of military
force to
support the political end‑state …
“My
short‑term concern is that the issue blights transition … A line
needs to be
drawn under
this operation in the interest of achieving Iraqi self‑reliance …
My long
term
concerns centre around the defining impact these investigations
will have
for our
future operations and indeed rationale. Firstly, the ‘Untouchable’
status of
ISOF [Iraqi
Special Operations Forces] is already being attacked by the
sectional
interest
within the GOI [Government of Iraq] that (quite rightly) feel
threatened by
such a
body. The fear is that their freedom of movement and action is
curtailed, their
operations
politically constrained; this would be most damaging to ISOF itself
and
PM Maliki’s
ability to operate to the national interest. Secondly, the danger
is that
political
constraints are so tightly drawn that MND(SE) cannot operate
against the
356
eGram
9918/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 12 March 2007, ‘Iraq – Call on
General Petraeus, 11 March’.
125