3.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, January to April 2002 –
“axis of evil” to Crawford
32.
On 11
February, Sir Christopher Meyer advised that President Bush’s
reference to
an “axis of
evil” was:
“… a
warning to regimes which Bush sees as especially dangerous. It is
not
simplistic;
it increases expectations of military action against Iraq; and it
has added
to
transatlantic strains.”12
33.
Sir
Christopher reported that it was “the latest version of the Bush
doctrine” which
rotated “on
an axis which links terrorist networks, states which harbour them,
and rogue
states with
WMD”. President Bush had set out the first version of the doctrine,
which
comprised
the elements in his speech to Congress on 20 September 2001.
Rogue
states had
been added because “intelligence and the anthrax scare have
generated the
view that
WMD in the hands of rogue states is the clear and present
danger”.
34.
President Bush
had been “criticised for enunciating the doctrine without
thinking
through the
policy implications”. In Sir Christopher’s view, that missed the
point. The
purpose in
naming three countries was “to intimidate them, to put them on
notice that
they were
marked regimes; to ‘change the terms of the debate’”. There was a
“serious
analysis”
behind the phrase:
“It cannot
be emphasised too strongly that 11 September was a shattering
blow,
creating a
sense of threat and vulnerability never before experienced by
Americans.”
35.
The
consequences were:
•
“an
outpouring of American gratitude to Britain, which more than
others
appeared
instantly to grasp the enormity of what had happened”;
•
“incomprehension
and anger at those who seemed more concerned for the
rights of
the Guantanamo detainees than for the need to extract
information
which could
forestall a further atrocity”; and
•
“a
single-minded determination to do what it takes to defeat the nexus
of
terrorism
and rogue WMD, if necessary by pre-emptive action, with or
without
allies”,
which President Bush saw “as his life’s mission”.
36.
Sir
Christopher did not believe that the speech presaged military
action against Iran
or North
Korea, but the phrase had “raised expectations about action against
Iraq”. That
did “not
involve any new policy considerations”. The UK had “known for a
long time” that
President
Bush was “looking for a way to get rid of Saddam”.
37.
Sir
Christopher concluded:
“It has
been tough sometimes working with the Americans since 11 September.
It will
be tougher
still in 2002 …
12
Telegram
196 Washington to FCO London, 11 February 2002, ‘US Foreign Policy:
The Axis of Evil’.
393