9.5 |
June 2006 to 27 June 2007
387.
In relation to
the surge of US forces, Sir Nigel wrote that there was
“insufficient
clarity on
the nature of the mission – is this just a repeat of the Baghdad
security plan;
or does
it go wider, eg Anbar, border with Iran etc?”
388.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald suggested that Mr Blair should discuss with
President Bush:
“–
The
need for him to present this as a change
of policy,
though not of course of
objectives
…
–
The
need to put emphasis both in public and in terms of the follow‑up
on Iraqi
capability
…
–
The
need to make clear that the numbers and
mission of coalition forces
depends on the
situation on the ground. So what
happens in Baghdad (surge
of US
forces) should not pre‑determine what happens in Basra
(where
we
anticipate
a drawdown over the next six months following Operation
Sinbad).
It is
important that Bush does not say anything next week which
prejudices
our plans
…”
389.
Sir Nigel was
explicit that the UK Chiefs of Staff did not support the US
surge.
390.
On 5 January,
President Bush briefed Mr Blair ahead of his speech on Iraq
the
following
week.212
During the
call he described a significant increase in US and
Iraqi
troops, and
a number of personnel changes.
391.
Mr Blair
said that it was vital to break the back of the violence in
Baghdad. He
urged
President Bush to focus on reconciliation and reconstruction as
well as security,
suggesting
that it might be helpful to designate individuals who would be
accountable
for leading
work on those areas.
392.
Mr Blair
suggested that it would be vital to make clear that the coalition
was
supporting
Iraqi efforts to establish security, so that “it did not look like
it was just about
increasing
US troops”. President Bush agreed.
393.
On 6 January,
Prime Minister Maliki delivered what Mr Asquith described
as
a “robust”
speech for Iraq’s Army Day, in which he called for Armed Forces
that were
without
political bias, cohesive in the national interest and protected
from political
interference
and militia.213
He
warned:
“We will
not allow anybody to be an alternative to the state, whether the
militias
or anybody
else, regardless of their affiliations … We will confront them
firmly.”
394.
The following
day, Mr Asquith met Prime Minister Maliki to congratulate him
on
his speech,
to convey concern at the way in which Saddam Hussein’s execution
had
been
handled and to discuss dealing with the militias. They also
discussed Mr Maliki’s
212
Letter
Phillipson to Hayes, 5 January 2007, ‘Prime Minister’s phonecall
with President Bush,
5 January:
Iraq’.
213
eGram
534/07 Baghdad to FCO London, 7 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister
al‑Maliki, 7 January’.
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