9.7 | May
2008 to October 2009
sense but
Lt Gen Austin thought that Gen Petraeus might take the view that it
would be
presentationally
difficult for the US.
135.
Maj Gen
White-Spunner commented that if the transfer did not go ahead, “it
will not
make much
practical difference to us as MND(C) are already dealing with
governance
and
economic reconstruction”.
136.
On 18 July,
Mr Brown’s Private Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed
Mr Brown
that Prime
Minister Maliki had told Mr Prentice that he wanted to end the
coalition
presence in
Iraq as soon as possible.49
Prime
Minister Maliki did not want to agree
to the
continuation of any coalition forces other than the US beyond the
end of 2008.
US officials
were concerned by this proposal and by the wording of
Mr Brown’s
statement
which declared an end to Op TELIC and withdrawal of all UK combat
troops
in early
2009.
137.
On the same
day, BBC
News reported a
White House announcement that:
“Improving
conditions should allow for the agreements now under
negotiation
to include
a general time horizon for meeting aspirational goals – such as
the
resumption
of Iraqi security control in their cities and provinces and the
further
reduction
of US combat forces from Iraq.”50
138.
According to
the report, the announcement was prompted by Prime Minister
Maliki,
raising the
prospect of setting a timetable for the withdrawal of US troops as
part of
negotiations
of a new security agreement.
139.
Mr Brown
visited Iraq on 19 July, during which he held a bilateral meeting
with
140.
Mr Brown
underlined to Prime Minister Maliki the UK’s wish to help on key
issues,
including
Basra port, oil and the steel industry as well as the training of
14 Division.
He commented
that the Iraqi police and army were “increasingly ready” and
capable of
taking over
their responsibilities.
141.
Prime Minister
Maliki agreed that it was in the interests of both countries to
have
long-term
co-operation in all fields, including training the military. The
Iraqi people’s
desire for
the departure of all foreign forces did not necessarily mean that
they were
ungrateful
for the help that had been provided, but they wanted to be a
sovereign nation
and he did
not feel that there was a need for such a large number of foreign
forces to
be present.
142.
Mr Brown
explained that UK forces would not stay longer than was
necessary
to “finish
the tasks we had started”, specifically training 14 Division,
making Basra
49
Email
Fletcher to Brown, 18 July 2008, ‘Iraq’.
50
BBC
News, 18 July
2008, US seeks
‘time horizon’ on Iraq.
51
Letter
Fletcher to Hickey, 19 July 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Meeting with
Prime Minister Maliki, 19 July’.
403