The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“A quick
win would be moving 16 Air Assault Brigade to Baghdad with the task
of
providing
police training for six weeks … The Chiefs will let you [Mr Blair]
have
advice
today or tomorrow … I have no doubt that the impact of British
troops training
with, and
working alongside, Iraqis would be considerable … The hard
pressed
Bremer is
very keen to have them.”
371.
A UK military
report from Basra on 19 May recorded that “widespread looting
…
has ceased,
but there has been an increase in theft and
scavenging”.251
The port
of
Umm Qasr
had been handed back to Iraqi control.
372.
Sir David’s
presence in Iraq overlapped with a visit by Major General
David
Richards,
Assistant Chief of the General Staff, who visited Iraq from 17 to
21 May at the
request of
Mr Hoon and Gen Walker to scope the potential for a UK role in
improving the
proposed
Security Sector Reform (SSR) programme.252
373.
Maj Gen
Richards reported:
“Despite US
Occupation of the city [Baghdad] for the last four weeks, the law
and
order
situation is fragile. The indigenous police service has not
returned to work
in any
coherent manner. 3 ID [the US Third Infantry Division] are clearly
tired and
wrongly
configured to conduct joint military/police patrolling
…
“… the
immediate requirement is clearly to restore law and order in
Baghdad.
Two key
areas have been identified for the UK to make a contribution.
First, and
supported
strongly by Bremer, Slocombe, Sawyer and US and UK military, is
the
rapid
deployment of 16 Air Asslt Bde (-)253
to create
the nucleus of an effective police
force in
Baghdad. It should achieve this through galvanising and taking
control of
ORHA’s
creation of a functioning police force and effective guard service.
Second,
and in the
longer term, to place UK personnel in key appointments within
the
organisations
responsible for delivering SSR.”
374.
Maj Gen
Richards’ recommendation was that 16 Air Assault Brigade should
be
“deployed
at best speed to Baghdad”.
375.
On 20 May, Mr
Sawers reported to the FCO in London on the impact of
Ambassador
Bremer’s arrival in Baghdad, which he judged had “made a
big
difference”.254
He
summarised his assessment as:
“Security
in Baghdad remains the most urgent issue. The military are
being
pressed
hard to change their modus operandi, and are starting to adjust.
Our ideas
for
building up the Baghdad Police are greeted with keen interest. The
problems
251
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 19 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Latest
Developments’.
252
Minute ACGS
to CDS/PSO, 20 May 2003, ‘ACGS’ Trip to Iraq (17-21 May 03) –
Initial Findings
and Recommendations’.
253
This minus
symbol indicates that some elements of the brigade would not be
included in the
deployment.
254
Telegram 18
IraqRep to FCO London, 20 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Bremer’s
Impact’.
198