4.4 | The
search for WMD
766.
The meeting of
the JIC Sub-Committee on Iraq/WMD on 29 March, chaired
by
Mr Scarlett,
discussed plans for responding to Mr Duelfer’s testimony,
including a draft
summary of
key points which had been sent to Mr Duelfer.424
767.
The key points
included:
•
“Iraq was
remarkably successful in eroding UN sanctions. Containment
strategy
was being
systematically undermined by several countries including
key
members of
the UNSC.”
•
“Iraq
derived billions of dollars between 1999 and 2003 from oil
smuggling,
kickbacks
and abuse of the Oil-for-Food [OFF] programme. This was outside
the
control of
the UN and free for the regime to spend without
restriction.”
•
“ISG has
information regarding dual-use facilities and ongoing research
suitable
for a
capability to produce CBW at short notice.”
•
“ISG has
also found evidence to indicate Iraqi interest in preserving
and
expanding
the knowledge needed to design and develop nuclear
weapons.”
•
“In
addition … the ISG has continued to uncover very robust programmes
for
delivery
systems.”
•
“The ISG is
focusing on the broader picture of regime intent and how
the
technical
developments fit into this picture in an integrated
manner.”
768.
Mr Blair
and President Bush discussed the impact of the ISG Status Report
on
30 March.425
Mr Blair
said that the draft he had seen was quite good and certainly
better
than it
might have been. Expectations in the UK were low. The more detail
that could be
declassified
and put into the text the better. Mr Duelfer’s methodology was
better than
Dr Kay’s,
which had not been rigorous.
769.
Mr Duelfer
delivered his testimony to Congress later on 30 March,
explaining:
“This
Report is very limited in scope. It is intended to provide a status
report of my
efforts at
steering the ISG. It is not
a
preliminary assessment of findings.”426
770.
The Status
Report incorporated many of the key points sent to
Mr Duelfer
by the
UK:
•
Challenges.
Iraqi managers, scientists and engineers were extremely
reluctant
to speak
freely and documents were not easy to interpret. The ISG still did
not
fully
understand regime intentions.
424
Minute
Scarlett to Howard, 29 March 2004, ‘JIC Sub-Group Meeting on
Iraq WMD’ attaching Paper
[unattributed],
[undated], ‘ISG Report – Summary of Key Points’.
425
Letter
Quarrey to Owen, 30 March 2004, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
Bush, 30 March: Iraq’.
426
Central
Intelligence Agency, 30 March 2004, Testimony
by Charles Duelfer on Iraqi WMD Programs.
573