12.2 | Conclusions: Security Sector Reform

broad strategic plan was being developed and the disconnected ways of working were

becoming a thing of the past. While that work may have been under way at that time, the

Inquiry has not seen any evidence of a national strategy being produced as a result.

113. By the end of 2005, Whitehall remained overly optimistic about ISF development.

In papers prepared for DOP(I) on 20 December, the MOD stated that the development

of the Iraqi Army remained on track for the fully funded and trained figure of 130,000 by

December 2006 and the IPS was making an increasingly significant contribution

although it was behind the Iraqi Army in development terms. There remained a

significant issue about whether the Iraqi Government and ministries had the capacity

to direct and sustain the civil and military security forces. That was alongside the risk of

increasing sectarianism and militia infiltration.

114. Mr Blair told President Bush on 23 December: “The two clear messages were: the

vital nature of leadership of the MOI and MOD; and 2006 being the year of the police.”63

115. In late 2005, General George Casey, who became Commander of the CJTF‑7

in June 2004, designated 2006 as the “Year of the Police”, recognising that a national

police force was vital to any exit strategy.

116. From 2006, the UK appears to have stopped lobbying for the creation of a national

SSR strategy and instead focused on what was necessary to enable the withdrawal of

troops. Without a means to measure progress objectively, success continued to mean

the number of officers trained.

117. Acting Deputy Chief Constable Colin Smith, Chief Police Adviser Iraq, wrote about

the Year of the Police in January 2006 that “the strap line that ‘just enough is good

enough’ is, whilst probably realistic, not particularly encouraging”.64 He wrote that it could

be “a defining factor in the development of an effective Iraqi Police Service”.

118. In March 2006, Dr Reid continued to press ahead with drawdown and announced

that troop levels would reduce in May 2006 from approximately 8,000 to around

7,200 based on “completion of various security sector reform tasks, a reduction in

the support levels for those tasks, and recent efficiency measures in theatre”.65 That

rationale did not include an assessment of the effect of those tasks on the capability of

the ISF.

63 Letter Quarrey to O’Sullivan, 23 December 2005, ‘Iraq’ attaching ‘Note Prime Minister to

President Bush’.

64 Minute Smith, 1 January 2006, ‘UK Chief Police Advisor – Iraq: Weekly Report: Week Ending Sunday

1st Jan 2006’.

65 Letter Reid to Blair, 9 March 2006, ‘Iraq: Force Level Review and Announcement’.

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