The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
905.
In the best
case scenario, the ISF would be able to achieve its military and
security
objectives
in Basra (possibly with MNF help), allowing Prime Minister Maliki
to return to
Baghdad
with a “success” and able to act in a way that was seen by others
(particularly
the Sunni)
as inclusive.
906.
Mr Prentice
thought that neither of these extreme scenarios was likely – and
the
most likely
outcome would be something in between. He continued:
“The new
Iraq has survived since 2003 through expediency. Their politicians
and
criminals
are all capable of moving from violence to dialogue and back again
with
little
pause. In this case, despite Maliki’s … rhetoric about fighting JAM
to the bitter
end, there
will be a limit to Shia tolerance for such internecine strife.
Already … a
compromise
seems to be emerging.
“Other
politicians have had a major scare and, including even the
Sadrist
mainstream,
will have had an object lesson in why all factions need to put
aside
their
criminal wings. The tectonic plates of central Iraqi politics have
shifted and all
factions
are assessing the opportunities they may have after the immediate
security
crisis
passes. Until now, Maliki has not been aware of the weakness of his
position.
The rude
awakening … which he will receive on return to Baghdad may
prompt
him to be
more inclusive (and therefore more successful) as PM. There is also
a
real
possibility that the UIA will splinter as a result of the pressure
his operation has
produced
and as elections approach across the South. It is too early to draw
up the
order of
winners and losers but the prospect is of complex politicking and a
range of
pragmatic
compromises.
“We should
hope that Sadrist and other politicians will see opportunity in
exploiting
the
aftermath to return to government. In the case of the Sadrists,
this will require
them
getting the message convincingly from other factions that they
recognise
Sadrism as
an essential constituent of Iraqi politics. To achieve this, the
compromise
yet to be
worked out over Basra will have to have some plausible element
of
discipline
by the Sadrists on their violent fringe. The compromise cannot be a
thinly
disguised
climb-down in the face of JAM violence.”
907.
Considering
how the UK could best support the outcome, Mr Prentice
suggested
that the
main areas for UK activity should be:
•
encouraging
Prime Minister Maliki to “draw the right lessons”, seeking
to
persuade
him that (contrary to his historic suspicions about the UK) the UK
had
always
supported him and wanted to “put this chapter behind us”; helping
him
realise
that he had been the victim of “catastrophic advice and false
intelligence”
which
nearly led to his humiliation; and persuading him that the success
of his
government
required dismissal of those responsible;
•
encouraging
the Iraqi Government to act against all militias, not just
JAM;
348