The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
identified
as associated with its proscribed programmes or who had been
involved
in Iraq’s
unilateral destruction of its weapons and facilities.
559.
The large
number of intelligence reports about Iraq’s activities were
interpreted
from the
perspective that Iraq’s objectives were to conceal its
programmes.
560.
Similarly,
Iraq’s actions were consistently interpreted as indicative of
deceit.
561.
From early
2003, the Government drew heavily on the intelligence reporting
of
Iraq’s
activities to deceive and obstruct the inspectors to illustrate its
conclusion that
Iraq had
no intention of complying with the obligations imposed in
resolution 1441.
562.
The Government
also emphasised the reliability of the reporting.
563.
The JIC’s
judgement from August 2002 until 19 March 2003 remained that
Iraq
might use
chemical and biological weapons in response to a military
attack.
564.
Iraq’s
statements that it had no weapons or programmes were dismissed as
further
evidence of
a strategy of denial.
565.
In addition,
the extent to which the JIC’s judgements depended on inference
and
interpretation
of Iraq’s previous attitudes and behaviour was not
recognised.
566.
At no stage
was the hypothesis that Iraq might not have chemical,
biological
or nuclear
weapons or programmes identified and examined by either the JIC or
the
policy
community.
567.
After its 9
September 2002 Assessment, the JIC was not asked to review
its
judgements
on Iraq’s capabilities and programmes which underpinned UK
thinking.
Nor did
the JIC itself suggest such a review.
568.
As a result
there was no formal reassessment of the JIC judgements, and
the
9 September
Assessment and the 24 September dossier provided part of the
baseline
for the UK
Government’s view of Iraq’s capabilities and intentions on its
chemical,
biological,
nuclear and ballistic missile programmes.
569.
Given the
weight which rested on the JIC’s judgements about Iraq’s
possession
of WMD and
its future intent for the decision in March that military action
should, if
necessary,
be taken to disarm Iraq, a formal reassessment of the JIC’s
judgements
should have
taken place.
570.
This might
have been prompted by Dr Blix’s report to the Security Council
on
14 February
2003, which demonstrated the developing divergence between
the
assessments
presented by the US and UK. Dr Blix’s report of 7 March, which
changed
the view
that Iraqi behaviour was preventing UNMOVIC from carrying out its
tasks,
should
certainly have prompted a review.
76