Previous page | Contents | Next page
The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
“Fallujah by October/November 2004 was, by all accounts, a major terrorist haven
… there were said to be thousands of terrorists, and it was certainly a factory for
car bombs.”167
320.  Lt Gen Sir John Kiszely told the Inquiry that Prime Minister Allawi sought regular
advice from US and UK Ambassadors as he considered action in Fallujah:
“But on the coalition side we were careful to make sure that any decision that was
made was, and was seen to be, an Iraqi Government decision and nobody else’s.”168
321.  Mr Chaplin said:
“Our own view was one of caution, highlighting the risks and making sure that Allawi
considered really carefully the pros and cons. But in the end it was his decision, and
of course an American decision …
“Our main involvement and the main thing we emphasised afterwards was that
if there had to be military action, then the government needed to organise itself
to ensure there was rapid follow-up …” 169
322.  Following authorisation by Prime Minister Allawi, offensive operations began
in Fallujah on 8 November, at 1900 local time.170
323.  An update on the operation sent on 9 November reported that initial resistance
had been light, but was likely to increase as US forces and the ISF closed in on
insurgent strongholds.171
324.  On 10 November Mr Chaplin reported from Baghdad:
“Only a week ago, Sunni and Shia parties appeared to have drawn the same
conclusions … that the elections should be delayed for a few months. The Sunnis
were worried that a January election would see insufficient security in the Sunni
triangle for a good Sunni voter turnout. The Shia parties … had woken up to the fact
that more time would be needed to make a success of diaspora voting …
“The arguments for delay are, for now, in abeyance.” 172
325.  On 10 November, ACM Torpy reported to Gen Walker the results of an interim
Force Level Review.173 It had concluded that no additional deployments were required
in support of election security, but one more battalion was required for SSR tasks.
167  Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 5.
168  Public hearing, 14 December 2009, pages 14-16.
169  Public hearing, 7 December 2009, page 19.
170  CNN World, 9 November 2004, Battle for Falluja under way.
171  Letter Baker to Phillipson, 9 November 2004, ‘Fallujah’ attaching Paper, 9 November 2004,
‘Fallujah Update – 091200Z Nov 14’.
172  Telegram 369 Baghdad to FCO London, 10 November 2004, ‘Iraq: Elections: The Politics;
Part two of two’.
173  Minute CJO to CDS, 10 November 2004, ‘Iraq – Interim Force Level Review’.
448
Previous page | Contents | Next page