6.1 |
Development of the military options for an invasion of
Iraq
176.
Mr Webb’s
view was that “the prospects for finding a stable political
solution”
were “poor
in the short term”; and that a coalition might be left “holding the
ring for a
significant
period”. Securing a mandate for a UN interim administration “could
be tricky”
so there
would be a “need to cater for some kind of sponsored interim
administration”.
177.
Mr Webb
added that “without proper access to US planning”, the options
were
“speculative”
but:
“Potential
US scenarios could embrace:
A. A
clandestine/Special Forces operation on a limited scale
…
B. A local
revolution, possibly supported by SF and a major air
campaign
(on a Northern
Alliance analogy, though the circumstances are very
different).
C. A major
military operation to secure centres of power such as Baghdad
…”
178.
Mr Webb
advised that the US had “sufficient forces to undertake a
military
operation …
without anyone else’s help”; but:
“To achieve
a successful regime change, the UK would need to be actively
involved
(one might
also argue that the Prime Minister has effectively committed
us).”
179.
If the US
mounted a major military operation, a UK contribution of only
Special
Forces,
cruise missiles and/or air support “would be seen as only token …
confer no
significant
influence on US planning (and would be adversely contrasted with
Britain’s
contribution
during the [1990/91] Gulf War).”
180.
Setting out
the MOD’s thinking on military issues, Mr Webb
wrote:
•
“The
fundamental building block for [a UK contribution to] a major US
ground
force
operation is a division. Only on that scale (requiring 3 brigades
as our
planning
base) would UK have significant influence over how the
operation
was
developed and conducted: an independent brigade does not fit into
the US
structure
and would in any case need substantial divisional scale enablers
in
order to be
safe for high intensity operations … Such a deployment would be
at
the extreme
end of the UK’s capacity after the SDR: it was the scenario
against
which the
‘large’ option was scaled.”
•
The UK
“should seek only to make a respectable large contribution that we
can
92
In a
handwritten amendment to the draft letter Lt Gen Pigott
suggested amending the sentence “Without
access to
US planning, which is only now beginning …” to “Without formal
access to US planning …” He
also
recommended inserting “a 3 brigade division” in the description of
the potential UK force contribution
of a
division.
203