3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
on Iraq’s
past record of deceit”. There was a “need to avoid giving the
impression that an
omission in
the declaration would, in itself, constitute a material breach”.
The UK should
caution the
US “against a rush to judgement”.
207.
The UK aim
should be to get the inspectors to “check (or audit)” the
declaration
“as soon as
possible through intrusive inspections, interviews and access to
records”
against
information from other sources, including:
•
The
information available to UNSCOM in 1998. If Iraq declared
“nothing”, it
“must
demonstrate the destruction of material or the disbandment of
possible
WMD
programmes identified by UNSCOM”.
•
“Intelligence
material provided by the US/UK. We have already
pointed
UNMOVIC
towards key sites and provided a list of 6,500 individuals
involved
in WMD
programmes”; the DIS was “working on a top ten list of
people”.
UNMOVIC/IAEA
was “willing to visit sites not mentioned” by Iraq but they
would
“not want
to be seen to be taking instructions from the UK/US”.
•
“Information
obtained … through early interviews …”
Where the
declaration was “inconsistent with intelligence”, the UK would
“want
UNMOVIC/IAEA
to be able to discover that inconsistency on the ground before
notifying
the
Council”. That would avoid giving Iraq the chance to conceal
evidence.
208.
The FCO stated
that an early initial meeting of the Security Council
in
mid‑December
would demonstrate support for the inspectors and maintain
pressure
on Iraq as
well as demonstrating the intention “to keep the Council at the
centre of Iraq
handling”.
That should also call for a more detailed discussion of the
declaration in early
January.
That would “give the US/UK a better opportunity (and more time) to
highlight
shortcomings”
before the meeting of the Council to discuss the inspectors report,
which
was due on
27 January.
209.
The FCO letter
also provided a refined version of the advice in its letter to
Sir David
Manning of
15 November about what might comprise a material breach. This was
further
refined in
advice on 6 December, which is addressed later in this
Section.
210.
Mr Campbell
had asked Mr John Williams, FCO Press Secretary, for “a
wider
note on
handling in the context of a set of public objectives to be agreed
with the US”.
That would
include:
•
The
declaration would be “a key test of Iraq’s willingness to
comply”.
•
The
inspectors needed to test the declaration before a decision could
be taken
on whether
Saddam Hussein was in breach or complying.
•
The UK
would be drawing “any discrepancies or mis‑statements … to
the
attention
of UNMOVIC/IAEA and, if necessary the Security Council, where
the
issues will
be pursued”.
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