The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
•
Develop SSR
[Security Sector Reform] model, with DDR [disarmament,
demobilisation
and reintegration] aimed at reducing size and scope of
internal
security forces
•
Support SSR
with training and equipment
•
Begin
transfer [of] security of oilfields and production facilities to
Iraqi forces
•
Provide
international security guarantees
•
Scope of
tasks is likely to continue to demand large scale138
forces.
“Long Term
(2 – 10 years)
•
Support SSR
through training and presence on ground to effect
gradual
resumption
of full responsibility for internal and external security by
new
regime
•
Detention
of key regime figures
•
Exercises
to underpin international security organisations.”
243.
There was no
estimate of the scale of forces required for the long term, but
the
paper
included the “key judgement” that: “In the worst case, we need to
be prepared for
a
substantial long-term commitment.”
244.
The paper
listed “sustainability” as one of a number of principles
affecting
campaign
design. The post-conflict commitment needed to be “planned and
agreed
before we
embark on military action”. The paper advised that “sustainment
beyond
initial SDR
[Strategic Defence Review] assumptions” had not yet been factored
into
calculations,
and that prolonged post-conflict deployment would be a “significant
burden
on defence
resources”.
245.
The paper also
set out a list of actions required as “precursors” to shape
the
necessary
conditions for whichever military option was selected. They
included
preparations
“to support [a] new (post-conflict) regime, politically, militarily
and
economically”.
246.
The SPG paper
was revised five times between June and December. The
second
edition was
issued on 11 July.
247.
Between
March and June 2002, the British Embassy Amman and the
DIS
in London
continued to report on aspects of the political, social and
economic
situation
in Iraq.
138
Defined in
the 1998 Strategic Defence Review as deployments of division size
or equivalent.
156