The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
357.
The points
made by Mr Alan Duncan (Conservative) included:
•
Diplomatic
relations between the US and France and Germany were “to put
it
mildly,
scratchy”, but relations between Western democracies should not
“slide
into
disarray”.
•
The
Conservative Party shared the judgement, enshrined in resolution
1441,
that the
cost of doing nothing was greater than the cost of doing
something”.
The UK
should not resile from implementing resolution 1441.
•
Given “the
doubting mood of public opinion”, the Government should
focus
on Saddam
Hussein’s arsenal of weapons, not other issues such as links
with
terrorism
and the publication of an “utterly substandard dossier” which
diverted
attention
from the main issue and dented the Government’s
credibility.
•
Was a
second resolution, which a “fortnight ago” had “seemed a dead
cert”,
now touch
and go?
358.
Mr Mark
Oaten (Liberal Democrat):
•
Expressed
concerns about the impact on the unity of the
international
community
of ignoring a veto by one of the Permanent Members of
the
Security Council.
•
Asked why
Mr Straw was dismissing the options of further UN inspection
and
containment.
If the inspectors believed that “with more time, co-operation
and
space,
progress could be made, they should be given more
time”.
359.
In response to
those points, and subsequent questions, which included
both
support for
action and concerns, points made by Mr Straw
included:
•
It would be
the Government’s decision whether or not to move a
resolution.
It would
make decisions after the inspectors’ reports to the Security
Council the
following
day; decisions would be reported to the House of Commons as
quickly
as
possible.
•
The
Government was asking all the members of the Security Council,
when
they
assessed the inspectors’ reports, “to follow through the true
meaning of
the
language to which every single member … signed up”. The UK and
other
members of
the Security Council could not be in a position where they
believed
the
“conclusions following from the true meaning of 1441” were
“inescapable,
but one
member, for example”, sought “to avoid those
conclusions”.
•
Resolution
1441 was “a sufficient mandate” for military action because it
spelled
out “with
complete clarity” that there were “obligations on Iraq that it must
follow
through”,
which were “very straightforward”.
242