3.6 |
Development of UK strategy and options, November 2002 to January
2003
•
staying
closely engaged with the Arab world and exploring the recent
suggestion
that Saddam
Hussein should be given an ultimatum to leave Iraq.
410.
Returning to
the issue of a second resolution, Sir David wrote that he had
repeated
that it
would be needed:
“… if we
were to take military action. This was not because our
determination to deal
with the
Iraqi problem had diminished in any way. Rather it was about the
political
realities
in the UK.”
411.
Sir David
Manning recorded that the UK must now work closely with the
Americans
over
inspections and approaches to Dr Blix. He knew that the FCO
and SIS were
working on
that and he had asked for advice by 8 January, “on the best way
forward”,
which he
could show to Mr Blair.
412.
Sir David
and Dr Rice had also discussed the possibility of a meeting
between
President
Bush and Mr Blair.
413.
Sir David
recommended that Mr Blair should read the record of the
conversation in
full and
that it had been “helpful on a second resolution”.146
Dr Rice
had been very keen
that
President Bush and Mr Blair should meet at the end of
January.
414.
Describing
this conversation, Sir Jeremy Greenstock told the Inquiry that
Dr Rice
had told
Sir David Manning that:
“… she had
been giving considerable thought to this whole issue over the
Christmas
holidays
and had decided that a second resolution was necessary for
American
interests,
that the American public were not necessarily fully on board for an
attack
on Iraq and
the use of the American military and this was something that she
felt the
President
would need to consider very carefully.”147
415.
After the
conversation with President Bush on 16 December and the
meeting
of the
Security Council on 19 December, Mr Blair also reviewed the
position on
Iraq in the
light of likely US actions.
416.
By the time
Mr Blair returned to the office on 4 January 2003 he
had
concluded
that the “likelihood was war” and, if conflict could not be
avoided,
the right
thing to do was fully to support the US.
417.
Mr Blair
focused on the need to establish evidence of an Iraqi
breach,
persuade
opinion of the case for action, and finalise the strategy with
President
Bush at the
end of January.
146
Manuscript
comment Manning to PM, 3 January 2003, on Letter Manning to
McDonald, 3 January
2003,
‘Iraq: Conversation with Condi Rice’.
147
Public
hearing, 27 November 2009, pages 66‑67.
75