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3.5  |  Development of UK strategy and options, September to November 2002 –
the negotiation of resolution 1441
UN route”. Mr Straw had also said that France was making clear it would not support
war at all, China “didn’t care, and Russia was playing hardball”.112
332.  Mr Campbell wrote that the US “wanted one resolution that would allow them to hit
Iraq at the first sign of Saddam lying or causing trouble”. Mr Blair had described his first
conversation with President Bush as “difficult”. President Bush was “beginning to wonder
whether we are going down the right road”. Mr Campbell wrote that the US was “getting
more and more impatient”.
333.  Mr Campbell also wrote that President Clinton’s references to Iraq in his speech
to the Labour Party Conference were intended to convey the view that Mr Blair “was
in a position to influence US policy” and to get President Bush “to side with [Secretary]
Powell”. But Mr Blair was “less confident we could get the tough resolution we wanted”.
President Bush had told Mr Blair that he was “having trouble holding on to my horse”.
Mr Campbell wrote it was clear that President Bush was trying to get Mr Blair “to agree
that if Saddam was found to be lying that was a ‘casus belli’ ”.
334.  Following the second conversation between Mr Blair and President Bush,
Mr Campbell wrote that Mr Blair was concerned that rhetoric aimed at managing the
Republican right wing would stop President Bush getting to the right policy positions;
and that Mr Blair “seemed to be moving to the view that this [the US Administration]
was a government that was ruthless about its own power and position”.
335.  In his memoir, Mr Straw wrote that in his first conversation with President Bush,
Mr Blair’s mind was on the Labour Party Conference and he:
“… simply didn’t make the key points. I told him that, however embarrassing,
he’d have to make the call again. It was fixed for later that evening.”113
336.  Mr Straw wrote that the second call:
“… went well. We had a text to broker with the other members of the Security
Council.
“There then followed an extraordinary five‑week period in which not just every
phrase, but every word, and even the punctuation, was the subject of the closest
debate and argument. I often spent hours each day in telephone calls with Colin
[Powell] and Dominique de Villepin and Igor Ivanov, as well as with the Chinese
foreign minister, Tang Jiaxuan and the foreign Ministers of the non‑permanent
members of the Security Council.”
112 Campbell A & Hagerty B. The Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power: Countdown
to Iraq. Hutchinson, 2012.
113 Straw J. Last Man Standing: Memoirs of a Political Survivor. Macmillan, 2012.
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