1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
opportunity
to come forward with their own proposals for unilateral easing of
sanctions”,
set out
parameters for a new “Controlled Goods List”, and described in
broad terms the
arrangements
by which it would be enforced.
264.
In his
covering letter, Mr Sawers stated that:
•
There was
common ground between the US and UK on the NFZs.
•
The UK had
suggested that the question of regime change should be
addressed
through a
‘Contract with the Iraqi People’.
•
Efforts to
chart a way forward on sanctions at a working level had got
“bogged
down”.
Sticking to the present arrangements while loosening some of the
holds
that the US
and UK had placed on OFF programme contracts, combined with
a
renewed
diplomatic effort, would be an advance but would “fall a good way
short
of the
goals the Prime Minister and President agreed”. Mr Sawers
concluded:
“So our
strong preference is to be more ambitious, and be prepared to
agree
changes to
the sanctions regime in the Security Council, and put real
pressure
on Iraq’s
neighbours to implement the agreed controls
vigorously.”
265.
Mr McKane
reported to Mr Sawers on 6 April that useful progress was being
made
“to put
flesh on the bones” of the policy framework attached to Mr Sawers’
letter of
7 March.147
The UK and
the US appeared “to be in agreement on the broad
direction,
but there
is still some way to go not least in working out the details of a
deal under which
Iraq’s
neighbours would agree to bring all Iraqi oil revenues under UN
control”.
266.
On sanctions,
Mr McKane advised that the UK and US agreed on the case
for
moving
towards a single list of goods subject to UN controls (thereby
freeing up the
import of
other goods). Discussions still had to take place on the
composition of that
list.
Further talks with US State Department officials on 17 April would
be followed by
talks with
the French and “in due course” the Russians. The aim was to obtain
UN
endorsement
of a more targeted sanctions package in the OFF roll-over
resolution
due in
June.
267.
On bringing
illegal Iraqi oil exports under UN control, Mr McKane advised that
it
was “not
yet clear what concessions might have to be offered to the
neighbouring states
to persuade
them to co-operate”. Increased investment in border controls would
“only
make sense
if Iraq’s neighbours can be persuaded to co-operate – enforcement
would
be carried
out by their customs personnel”. The UK paper on border controls
had been
passed to
the US.
268.
Mr McKane
advised that the UK paper on the controls that should remain in
place
after the
suspension of sanctions had been passed to the US. An essential
feature was
maintaining
the UN escrow account (see Section 1.1) “so that Iraq’s oil revenue
(or other
significant
sources of foreign exchange revenue) cannot be used to purchase
either
conventional
or unconventional arms or dual use items”.
147
Minute
McKane to Sawers, 6 April 2001, ‘Iraq’.
243