11.1 |
De-Ba’athification
Embassy
wrote that Mr Maliki was “opposed to the participation of any
former Ba’athists
in
government institutions and public life”.
258.
When Prime
Minister Designate Maliki met Mr Patey and Sir Nigel
Sheinwald on
24 April,
he said he was “proud to be known as a hardliner” on
de‑Ba’athification but
acknowledged
that the de‑Ba’athification Commission had made some
mistakes.207
259.
Mr Maliki
planned to propose a “radical overhaul” that would transform
the
de‑Ba’athification
Commission into a “Truth and Reconciliation Commission,
sending
Ba’athists
who had committed crimes to the courts and rehabilitating those who
had
not”. He
was most concerned about Ba’athist military officers. The
establishment of a
“Commission
for Equality of Employment” would reassure Sunnis that they would
get
a fair
share of government jobs and that dismissals would not be
sectarian.
260.
On 10 May, the
JIC assessed how the Sunni insurgency was evolving.208
It concluded:
“The
strength of the insurgency is in part affected by Sunni
participation in the
political
process. If Sunni confidence is to be bolstered, respected Sunnis
will need
to gain
some major ministries. Even then, Sunni participation will remain
fragile.
Much will
depend on the actions of the new government in addressing broader
Sunni
concerns:
federalism, de‑Ba’athification, reform of the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF),
MNF
withdrawal, security and detainees, and improvement in the quality
of life.”
261.
On 19 July,
the JIC assessed that:
“Little has
changed in the nature and intensity of the Sunni Arab insurgency
since
our last
assessment in May. We continue to judge that the strength of the
insurgency
is in part
affected by Sunni participation in the political process. Prime
Minister
Maliki’s
government includes Sunnis in Ministerial and executive positions,
and
some key
Sunni demands have been partially met; for example, limited release
of
detainees.
Maliki has announced a National Reconciliation Plan aimed at
addressing
wider Sunni
concerns, but there has been no substantive progress as yet.
Some
Sunni
politicians have voiced their scepticism at Maliki’s offer of
amnesty (on current
proposals
most insurgents need not apply), plans to relax de‑Ba’athification,
and his
lack of
reference to an MNF withdrawal timetable.”209
262.
On 27 July,
the IPU reported to the British Embassy Baghdad that the Iraq
Strategy
Group had
agreed:
“… the
review Maliki has promised of de‑Ba’athification needs to happen
urgently.
This is not
only important to operationalising his national reconciliation
plan: but
207
eGram
13126/06 Baghdad to FCO London, 24 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Government
Formation: Maliki’s Views’.
208
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2006, ‘Iraq: How is the Sunni Insurgency
Evolving?’
209
JIC
Assessment, 19 July 2006, ‘Iraq: Insurgency, Sectarianism and
Violence’.
49