3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
and VX.
Since then, the inspectors had been prevented from doing their job
properly.
War must be
a last resort but the international community could not allow
Saddam
Hussein to
play games and spin things out. Proper access to scientists was one
key
to progress.
860.
Mr Scarlett
was reported to have told President Fox that the UK had
developed:
“… a range
of sources, some inside Iraq, that had proven reliability. We had
built
up a
consistent picture in which we had confidence. Our allies,
including Europeans,
had no
serious differences of substance with us …
“While we
believed that UNSCOM had been able to disarticulate Iraq’s
nuclear
programme
it had not been able to account for a wide range of chemical
and
biological
materials – we were particularly worried about VX and anthrax.
Even
conservative
estimates of material Iraq still held indicated the capacity to
assemble
thousands
of WMD artillery shells. Since 1998 Iraq had continued to
produce
new agents,
develop its missile capability and, with less success,
reconstitute
its nuclear programme.
“In 2002 a
conscious decision was taken to deny possession of WMD to
frustrate
a renewed
and strengthened inspection programme. We had watched a
policy
of concealment
and intimidation develop. Evidence had been dispersed,
factories
cleaned up
and scientists cowed.
“… Some
UNMOVIC successes in January resulted in further efforts to
hide
evidence
and deceive inspectors. Continued small successes forced
Iraq
to move to a
policy of slow, small concessions to give the impression of
movement
(eg on
missiles). For the UK, the litmus test would be interviews with
scientists.
Iraq realised
their knowledge was their Achilles heel, hence the
intimidation.”
861.
President Fox
was reported to have listened carefully and with an open
mind.
Mexico
wanted to continue to seek consensus. It did not like talk of
action “with or
without the
UN”; overriding international institutions had grave internal
consequences
for countries
nurturing fragile newly created institutions. He was attracted to
the
Canadian
idea of benchmarking Iraqi co-operation.
862.
Sir David
Manning had concluded that Mexican support for a second
resolution
was “not
impossible, but would not be easy and would almost certainly
require
some movement”.
863.
In a telephone
conversation with Mr Blair on 2 March, before his meeting
with
Sir David
Manning and Mr Scarlett, President Lagos wondered if there was
room for
clarification
of what the Security Council was trying to achieve.269
He was
worried that
talk of
regime change was overshadowing the issue of disarmament in the
media.
269
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 3 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation
with President of Chile,
2 March’.
335