The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
should be
asked to visit Iraq and that he wanted a UK Minister to take
ownership of the
overall
policing strategy, including liaison with the US over national
strategy, supported
by a
dedicated team in London.
106.
The critical
importance of ISF capability in assessing readiness for transfer
to
Provincial
Iraqi Control, on which UK plans to draw down were based, was
emphasised
by the
‘Conditions for Provincial Transfer’ published by the Joint
Iraqi/MNF Committee
to Transfer
Security Responsibility, and by Dr Reid, who told the Defence
and Overseas
Policy
Committee on Iraq (DOP(I)) on 12 October that “successful
Iraqiisation remains
the
key”.59
DOP(I)
decided that Dr Reid should have lead responsibility for
building the
capacity of
the IPS in Basra in addition to his responsibility for the Iraqi
Army.
107.
DOP(I)
discussed the need “to do more to speed up the development of
police” but
considered
that “the plan for ISF development that was in place was largely
sound”.60
108.
Mr Blair
asked for a major and sustained push to make progress on the
ability of
the ISF to
take the lead on security.
109.
General
Sir Mike Jackson, Chief of the General Staff, raised concerns
about
ISF
effectiveness in a minute to Gen Walker and concluded: “it is
not to our credit
that
we have known about the inadequacies of the IPS for so long
and yet failed to
110.
At the same
time, the JIC stated that the Iraqi armed forces stood
at
91,000 personnel
and MOI forces at 106,000 personnel, but that those figures
did
not take
account of absenteeism or provide an indication of true capability.
The IPS
suffered from
divided loyalties and a significant number were involved in
criminality for
financial
gain.
111.
In MND(SE),
there was a lack of confidence that plans to tackle
corruption
within the
IPS were working. There were questions about whether the IPS should
be
disbanded
and started from scratch. Major General James Dutton, General
Officer
Commanding
MND(SE) (GOC MND(SE)) from June 2005 to December 2005, told
the
Inquiry
that was why he had proposed a three‑point plan on 24 October. It
was more
focused on
reform than re‑design and reflected the new approach that “we
should be
aiming for
a police force that is relevant and ‘good enough’ for this
region”.62
112.
The need for a
single SSR strategy was raised again by Sir Ronnie
Flanagan
when he
visited Iraq in November to conduct another review of the
effectiveness of the
UK’s
policing strategy. In his final report of 31 January 2006,
Sir Ronnie reported that a
59
Paper Reid,
11 October 2005, ‘Iraq: Security update’.
60
Minutes, 12
October 2005, DOP(I) meeting.
61
Minute CGS
to CDS, October 2005, ‘CGS visit to Iraq: 10‑13 Oct
05’.
62
Letter
Dutton to Wall, 24 October 2005, ‘Policing SE Iraq’.
434