4.3 | Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

“But I do not accept, even with hindsight, that we were wrong to act as we did in the

circumstances that we faced at the time. Even after reading all the evidence detailed

by the Iraq Survey Group, it is still hard to believe that any regime could behave in

so self-destructive a manner as to pretend that it had forbidden weaponry, when in

fact it had not.”257

640. At the request of the JIC, its Assessments of Iraqi WMD programmes in 2002 were

reviewed in December 2004.258

641. The minutes of the JIC discussion on 22 December of the draft paper on WMD

recorded that the points made included:

• The paper had been produced at the JIC’s request and “reviewed the 2002 JIC

judgements of Iraqi WMD programmes, capabilities and intentions, in the light of

subsequent investigations, particularly the findings of the Iraq Survey Group”.

• The JIC’s 2002 judgements on ballistic missiles had been “partially

substantiated”. Iraq “had developed missiles that exceeded the legal range

of 150km, and had designs for missiles with ranges up to 1000km. The paper

should not be so definitive in its conclusions. While our knowledge had been

considerably enhanced, the ISG itself acknowledged that more information may

yet come to light, and the picture was still incomplete”.

• The box on the intelligence base in the Assessment “should highlight the limited,

fragmentary nature of the intelligence, and the fact that much of the CBW

reporting had been withdrawn. But the paper should also point out that many of

the JIC’s judgements were informed by UNSCOM reporting, and even without

the withdrawn intelligence, would have remained reasonable judgements based

on what we knew at the time”.

• The JIC “would discuss lessons learned as part of following up the Butler

Review recommendations”.259

642. The Assessment, issued on 23 December, made clear that it was not examining

the process through which assessments and judgements were made or attempting

to analyse the findings of the ISG in detail.260 The ISG findings provided “a baseline

against which to compare the pre-conflict JIC Assessments”. The ISG had “considerably

enhanced” the UK’s knowledge, but it had “acknowledged” that its findings were “by no

means definitive and new information may yet come to light”.

257 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 October 2004, columns 151-152.

258 JIC Assessment, 23 December 2004, ‘Iraqi WMD: Review of Judgements made in 2002’.

259 Minutes, 22 December 2004, JIC meeting.

260 JIC Assessment, 23 December 2004, ‘Iraqi WMD: Review of Judgements made in 2002’.

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