15.1 | Civilian
personnel
280.
Two FCO
officials visited Basra to identify a suitable location on 30 July,
24 hours
after
Sir Hilary Synnott’s arrival as the new Head of
CPA(South).195
They
reported that
Sir Hilary
had been very helpful, but that, in the absence of FCO staff able
to facilitate
the visit,
it had “bordered on farce at times”. Initially they had been told
there was no
transport
or protection available for a tour of the city, but the visit was
“saved at the
eleventh
hour from being a total disaster” by the MND(SE) visits officer and
MOD/
CPA liaison
officer. The officials did not reach firm conclusions on a location
and
recommended
“a more structured visit” soon.
281.
Sir Hilary
Synnott advised the FCO that December was not soon enough
to
establish a
bilateral presence in Basra.196
Commercial,
visa and consular demands were
all
increasing. Much as he would like to help, CPA(South) did not have
the capacity or
the mandate
to do so. He therefore recommended the early creation of a small
“UK
bilateral
cell” in Basra.
282.
Mr Straw
submitted a claim on the Reserve to cover the expected cost of
setting
up and
running the Basra Office in his letter to Mr Boateng on 18
July.197
283.
Mr Boateng
rejected Mr Straw’s claim on 9 September, explaining that he
“would
have
expected the FCO to have adjusted their internal Resource
Allocation Round at the
end of last
year” when faced with what was an “increasingly likely”
contingency.198
284.
In November
2003, Sir Nigel Sheinwald advised Mr Blair that the idea
of a bilateral
UK office
in Basra to handle “trade contacts, culture and visitors … fell by
the wayside in
the summer”
and needed to be revived.199
285.
Mr Blair
asked for the FCO to “put in place a British Office in Basra to
handle trade
contacts,
cultural ties, visitors etc”.200
286.
The IPU
advised Mr Straw that there would be advantage in revisiting
the idea
of setting
up a small unit in Basra for bilateral work, arranging visits and
managing the
establishment
of a post‑CPA British Office, “not least to flag up the resource
implications
to
No.10”.201
Costs could
be kept to a minimum by using staff already selected
for
other roles
and providing accommodation on the CPA(South) site. Other
Whitehall
departments
would join as the project developed.
287.
On 27
November, the FCO informed No.10 that it proposed to set up a
“Bilateral
Unit” in
Basra run by an FCO official, under the supervision of
Mr Henry Hogger, the
195
Paper FCO
Services [junior official], 5 August 2003, ‘Basra (Future
Offices)’.
196
Telegram 41
FCO London to Baghdad, 4 August 2003, ‘Iraq: Pursuing British
Interests in Southern
Iraq’.
197
Letter
Straw to Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 18 July 2003,
‘Iraq‑Related Costs’.
198
Letter
Boateng to Straw, 9 September 2003, ‘Iraq Reserve
claim’.
199
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 10 November 2003, ‘Visit to
Iraq’.
200
Letter
Rycroft to Adams, 11 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Next
Steps’.
201
Minute IPU
[junior official] to PS [FCO], 25 November 2003, ‘Iraq: Draft
Letter on British Office, Basrah’.
293