10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
PRT,
currently below strength and operating out of a hotel in Kuwait,
preferred to focus
on
long-term capacity-building. Co-location in the new year, when the
PRT moved to the
BAS, would
help but would not solve the underlying problems.
684.
Maj Gen
Shirreff recommended that the UK should establish a Joint
Inter-Agency
Task Force
(JIATF) with coalition partners, combining military and
reconstruction
expertise
under single military command.
685.
Lt Gen
Shirreff told the Inquiry that his proposal for a JIATF under
military
command was
a response to the fragmented UK effort at the time:
“… this was
sort of desperate times and desperate measures. I’m not sure I
would
necessarily
propose the same solution today … But at the time, it seemed to be
the
686.
The ISG
discussed Maj Gen Shirreff’s letter on 5 January
2007.388
Vice
Admiral
Charles
Style, Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (Commitments), said the letter
did not
reflect the
“MOD corporate view”, but that he had some sympathy for the need
for better
co-ordination
and command: the southern Iraq Steering Group had met only five
times
since May
2006, which was not good enough. Co-location at the BAS should
solve much
of the
problem, and the organisation needed to be tauter and more focused,
but not
necessarily
military-led.
687.
Sir Nigel
Sheinwald told the ISF that Iraq was “entering a new phase,
which
required a
coherent structure under a single point of contact” and asked for
the ISOG to
work on new
structures.
688.
Sir Nigel
reported to Mr Blair after the meeting that Maj Gen Shirreff’s
views:
“…
represent his frustration, shared by the MOD, that the civilian
reconstruction
effort is
uneven. We all agree that we need to make sure that we have an
effectively
led Basra
operation for the next year (at least).” 389
689.
Sir Nigel
advised that co-location of HQ MND(SE), the PRT and the
British
Embassy
Office Basra at BAS from late February would help co-ordination
enormously.
He had
asked the departments concerned, led by PCRU, to advise on the
right structure
for the
British effort. The balance of opinion was that “it should be
civilian-led, with strong
military
input and follow-up”.
690.
Sir Nigel
added that both DFID and the FCO were:
“… very fed
up with Shirreff’s disparaging comments about the civilian
effort
… But the
fact is that there have been constant problems between the
military
387
Public
hearing, 11 January 2010, page 42.
388
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 5 January 2007,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 5 January’.
389
Minute
Sheinwald to Prime Minister, 5 January 2007, ‘Iraq: Weekly Update’
attaching Paper Cabinet
Office, 5
January 2007, ‘Basra’.
307