12.1 |
Security Sector Reform
929.
On 7
September, the FCO circulated a Transition Plan for the IPS in
southern
Iraq, which
had been produced by the Consulate in Basra in consultation with UK
police
and
military in theatre and agreed with DFID, the MOD and the Home
Office.879
There
was
recognition that the Iraqi police had been limited in what they
could achieve due
to a lack
of trained personnel, shortages of equipment and inadequate
facilities. The
plan aimed
to address those factors by achieving a set of quantitative and
qualitative
targets in
the areas of training, police support infrastructure, intelligence
capability,
operational
capability and public support. The timetable for those targets was
driven by
the
established plans for military withdrawal.
“The IPS
runs its own operations in Southern Iraq. Standards across the
South
vary, but
generally speaking the IPS has a growing capacity to perform
policing
functions
from community patrolling to counter‑terrorism. It has enough
training and
equipment
to allow it to patrol 24 hours a day. It has the capability to
respond to calls
for
assistance from the public and co‑ordinate with other agencies in
an emergency.
It has the
resources to tackle public disorder and is capable of gathering
intelligence
and
detecting crime. It knows how to manage a crime scene and exploit
forensic
evidence.”
931.
The more
detailed figures on police training provided in the FCO plan,
when
compared
with earlier MOD papers, made clear that the overall figure of 55
percent of
police
trained masked considerable variations across MND(SE) – whereas 90
percent of
personnel
in Dhi Qar province had received training, the figures for Muthanna
and Basra
were
considerably lower (40 percent and 42 percent respectively). The
plan noted:
“Police
reform in Basra is the most complex task facing us. Far more police
need
training
than in the other provinces [in MND(SE)] combined; and the culture
of
corruption
and abuse is deeply ingrained. Militia infiltration threatens our
efforts to
encourage
an independent apolitical police force.”
932.
The plan
stated that the ability to solve those problems lay with the Iraqi
authorities
and that
there were no effective levers within the UK’s control. The FCO
concluded:
“The IPS in
Southern Iraq is functioning, with minimal supervision. We could
leave
today and
it would continue to function. There would, however, remain
serious
question
marks about the destabilising activities of the militias,
corruption, lack of
public
accountability and human rights abuse within the IPS. We are
addressing
these
problems but they will not disappear overnight … We know where we
want
to be at
transition … We must be realistic about what we can achieve here:
our
879
Letter FCO
[junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior official], 7 September
2005, ‘Iraqi Police Service
Transition
Plan for Southern Iraq’ attaching Paper Consulate Basra, 7
September 2005, ‘Southern Iraq:
Iraqi
Police service – Transitional Plan’.
267