3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
second
resolution because of public pressures”; it liked the Canadian idea
of a deadline.
Resolution
1441 already contained benchmarks, but they might have to be
presented
in a
different way. Sir David had also said that, if it came to war, it
would have to be
“through
the UN and with the UN heavily involved in the
aftermath”.
871.
Mr Scarlett
was reported to have described the intelligence assessment
and,
in response
to a specific question, informed President Lagos that “although
there were
some
differences of detail e.g. over the degree to which Saddam could
weaponise,
the French
assessment was similar” to the UK’s.
872.
President
Lagos repeated his concerns, including the difficulty of
securing
nine votes
or winning the presentational battle without further clarification
of Iraq’s
non-compliance,
and his suggestions to identify benchmarks with a short
deadline.
Sir David
Manning agreed to report the conversation to
Mr Blair.
873.
Mr Blair
wrote in his memoir that, during February, “despite his
best
endeavours”,
divisions in the Security Council had grown not reduced; and
that
the “dynamics
of disagreement” was producing new alliances.
France,
Germany
and Russia
were moving to create an alternative pole of power and
influence.
874.
Mr Blair
thought that was “highly damaging” but “inevitable”: “They
felt
as strongly
as I did; and they weren’t prepared to indulge the US, as they saw
it.”
875.
Mr Blair
concluded that for moral and strategic reasons the UK should
be
with the
US.
876.
Mr Campbell
wrote that Mr Blair had called him on 1 March “for a chat re
Blix”:
“A
combination of Blix and the recent moves by the Iraqis had got us
on the back foot
again.”
Mr Blair:
“… felt it
was all now about the politics of the UNSC, and would come down to
a
hard-headed
argument for votes. It was all going to ebb and flow but we just
had
to keep
going. He was clear that the consequences of not being with the US
now
were incalculable.
“I said I
felt there had been various points where we could have done
something
different
vis-a-vis the US. He said no, the only way to have had influence
with them
was to be
clear from the start that we would be with them when things got
really
tough. He
was clear that our interests were aligned.”271
877.
In his memoir,
Mr Blair wrote that, “politically, as well as to put the issue
beyond
any legal
claim to the contrary, a second resolution was certainly
desirable”.272
During
271
Campbell A
& Hagerty B. The
Alastair Campbell Diaries. Volume 4. The Burden of Power:
Countdown
to
Iraq. Hutchinson,
2012.
272
Blair
T. A
Journey.
Hutchinson, 2010.
337