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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
means that 30 April will now … see the completion of our current military mission”.1137
That process is described in greater detail in Section 9.7.
1214.  On 15 June, Mr Brown announced details of the UK’s new bilateral relationship
with Iraq, stating:
“On the day of the last combat patrol in April, I welcomed Prime Minister Maliki
and most of his Cabinet to London. We signed together a declaration of friendship,
partnership and co‑operation defining the new relationship between our two
countries for the future. At the request of the Iraqi Government, a small number of
British Navy personnel – no more than 100 – will remain in Iraq for long‑term training
of the Iraqi Army. Royal Navy ships will continue to protect the oil platforms on which
Iraq’s exports depend, and we will continue to offer training to the Iraqi Army as part
of a wider NATO mission. We will also offer training opportunities at Sandhurst and
elsewhere in the United Kingdom for Iraqi officers of high potential.”1138
1215.  In April 2009, the MOI capacity‑building programme was transferred to the US.1139
The UK continued work on policing under the Criminal Investigations and Policing
project, funded by the Middle East and North Africa Conflict Fund. The programme in
2009 had a budget of £7.1m and comprised three elements:
the civilian police mission in Baghdad with four officers, working with the
Baghdad Police Academy to help the IPS develop investigative techniques;
the civilian police mission in Basra with three officers; and
the forensics element in Basra, Baghdad and Erbil with two officers.
SSR in the South: summer 2006 to summer 2009
State of emergency
1216.  On 23 May 2006, Ms Aldred wrote to UK staff in Basra asking them for advice on
how to improve the situation in Basra.1140 Attached to the letter was “a strategic agenda
for action”. The paper gave a series of policy objectives (see Section 9.5) and stated
that to achieve them there would need to be continuing UK Government engagement
on SSR to ensure that the ISF were capable of:
tackling criminality;
bearing down on militias;
1137  Letter Hutton to Brown, 20 April 2009, ‘Iraq: End of Current Military Mission’.
1138  House of Commons, Official Report, 15 June 2009, columns 21‑22.
1139  Paper Stabilisation Unit [junior official] and Howlett‑Bolton, 27 November 2009, ‘Review of the support
to the Ministry of Interior and Iraqi Police Service Programme’.
1140  Letter Aldred to Lamb, Cooper & Kavanaugh, 23 May 2006, ‘Basra: The Way Forward’ attaching Note,
[undated], ‘Getting Basra Better: A Strategic Agenda for Action’.
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