The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
1038.
Mr Hoon
was advised on 14 November that:
“While it
seemed likely that Turkey would accept US forces, negotiations
would be
protracted.
The extent to which the US would press the Turks on our behalf
was
1039.
The “public
posture on specific military preparations” should remain “low
key”.
1040.
Lt Gen Reith
proposed that options in the South should also be
explored.
1041.
The paper
considering options for a UK land contribution, submitted
by
Lt Gen Reith
to the Chiefs of Staff on 18 November, advised that many of
the
assumptions
behind the force levels in Package 3 offered to the Americans for
planning
purposes
were no longer valid.416
The US had
“embraced the wider significance of
the North”
and allocated a US division to that axis, but it had withdrawn the
offer of
a US
armoured brigade operating under UK command. The northern option
would
require a
Corps level (three‑star) HQ, which had “yet to be found”; and there
was a
US
aspiration that the UK would contribute to and lead any
“three-star” HQ in the
North. The
uncertainties about Turkish co‑operation were also “a concern,
preventing
reconnaissance
and creating logistic uncertainty”.
1042.
PJHQ had,
therefore, “developed” four potential courses of action “in line
with
current US
thinking: one in the North and three in the South, which were
“feasible,
although
they [would] all require provision of an additional manoeuvre
brigade”.
1043.
In the South,
the UK would operate under US command. The paper
expanded
on the
advantages and disadvantages of each course of action, including
whether they
offered a
“high profile and worthwhile role” for the UK.
1044.
Lt Gen Reith
wrote:
“Without
Turkish co‑operation, UK forces may be either excluded from
participation
or, if
agreement is reached late, have their ability to participate in the
early stages
of the
campaign in the North compromised. This would impact on the
strategic
simultaneity
the plan is designed to achieve. To date, UK policy has been to
allow
the US to
act as the principal interlocutors … The results … have left our
position
uncertain.
“… If a
decision is not made soon, the UK may need to engage directly with
Tu[rkey]
to achieve
resolution.”
1045.
Lt Gen Reith
recommended discounting options of integrating a UK
brigade
within a US
division in the North and a UK division operating independently of
the
US. He
suggested that it would be “feasible” for the UK and US to
construct a Corps
415
Minute
Watkins to DG Op Pol, 14 November 2002, ‘Iraq: Ministerial
Briefing’.
416
Minute CJO
to DCDS(C), 18 November 2002, ‘Options for the UK Land
Contribution’.
332