6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
23.
By the time
decisions on the UK role were taken in March 2003, the
UK
contribution
had become central to the military campaign.
24.
The Chiefs of
Staff had an initial discussion of the proposal that the UK
should
provide a
division for military operations in southern Iraq on 6 January
2003.6
25.
Lieutenant
General John Reith, Chief of Joint Operations (CJO), reported a
US
view that
there was a “90 percent probability of no access” for UK ground
forces through
Turkey. The
delay had led Lt Gen McKiernan to conclude that he could place only
one
division
through a northern route into Iraq, and his preference was for that
to be the
US 4th
Infantry Division. Gen Franks had directed Lt Gen McKiernan to plan
on UK
ground
forces being integrated in the South.
26.
Lieutenant
General Sir Anthony Pigott, Deputy Chief of the Defence
Staff
(Commitments),
reported that he had been given a different steer by the Pentagon
as
recently as
one hour before the meeting. Lieutenant General George Casey,
Director
of the
Joint Staff, had “indicated that the UK’s military position had not
at all been a
hindrance
and had revealed that the northern axis remained of fundamental
strategic
significance
to the Campaign. It was possible that although the US military
might have
been
content to disengage the UK from the North, the political machine
might not be
so inclined.”
27.
Admiral Sir
Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS), directed that
the
ambiguity
should be resolved but it was “essential” to maintain “constructive
ambiguity”
in Iraq
over the potential for a northern threat”.
28.
It was also
“agreed that the time was now right” for a direct approach to
Turkey
at the
political level; and that it would be important to make separate
requests for the
forces in
Packages 2 and 3.
29.
Lt Gen Reith
described his latest paper on the land options, which was
“based
on a US
offer for the UK to operate at division strength (HQ 1(UK) Armd
Div; ATG
[Amphibious
Task Group]; 7 Bde [7 Armoured Brigade]; and 16 Air Asslt Bde) in
a
discrete
AOR in the South”. That plan “appeared to offer strategic influence
to the UK,
especially
in the move to Phase IV …”
30.
The US offer
of significant logistic support would “allow the UK to commit
fewer
personnel
but with an increased combat capability necessary because of the
nature
of the
task”.
31.
Lt Gen Reith
requested decisions by 8 January, including approval to
cease
planning
for the northern option and to reallocate Operation
FRESCO7
training.
6
Minutes, 6
January 2003, Chiefs of Staff meeting.
7
The use of
military forces to provide cover in the event of a strike by the
Fire Brigades’ Union.
391